Enforcement under the FTCA for false, misleading, and deceptive corporate statements about carbon offsets

July 9, 2023 / Brad Newsad

Corporations across the world, and in particular, the United States, are attempting to sway consumer opinion, perception, and patronage by advertising their status as, or goal to become, carbon neutral. Additionally, many companies are also offering opportunities for consumers to neutralize the carbon footprint of their own actions. Most of these claims involve some, if not a significant amount of “carbon offsets.”The weight of available evidence demonstrates that many claims of carbon offsetting are unfulfilled at best, and an outright scam at worst. The question is, what, if anything, should be done about these corporate actions?

Corporations should be held accountable for false, misleading, and deceptive statements regarding carbon neutrality and carbon offsetting, chiefly because these claims are hurting the climate change battle – companies are using claims of carbon neutrality and carbon offsetting as an excuse to avoid taking meaningful and sustainable carbon reduction actions. Importantly, it also creates an unfair advantage over those companies who have taken the moral high ground and refused to engage in the charade.While there may be several options for regulation – the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) – the best currently available option for enforcement is under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA).Several examples over the past decade demonstrate the viability of enforcement actions under the principles of the FTC’s “Green Guides.”[1]

Carbon Offsets

The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “carbon offset” as “an action or activity (such as the planting of trees or carbon sequestration) that compensates for the emission of carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases to the atmosphere.”[2] This definition accounts for the carbon offset theory of greenhouse gas (GHG) “removal” from the atmosphere.However, most organizations also include the GHG “reduction” or “avoidance” theory for carbon offsets.[3] Reduction and avoidance actions include supporting activities that reduce GHG emissions, such as funding GHG-free power generation projects (e.g., wind and solar power).Carbon offsets are often quantified and can be “bought, sold, or traded” for various purposes as discussed below.[4] Normally, offsets are accounted for on a one-for-one basis (one tonne of CO2eq avoided or removed can offset one tonne of CO2eq emitted).[5]

Generally, the motivation to buy or trade carbon offsets can be separated into two markets – the legally-required market and the voluntary market.Examples of the legally-required market include the actions taken in conformity with the Kyoto Protocol’s “Clean Development Mechanism” (CDM).[6] Under the Kyoto Protocol, developed country parties to the treaty were required to reduce their GHG emissions by a certain percentage as compared to their 1990 emissions.[7] However, for developed countries that were either unable or unwilling to reduce their actual GHG emissions to fully meet the required reduction, under the CDM they could fund projects in developing countries to earn “certified emissions reductions” (CERs). The CERs would offset a developed country’s actual GHG emissions, as long as the project was certified by an oversight committee to result in “[r]eal, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change” and the CERs were “additional to any that would occur in the absence of” the project.[8] These requirements form the foundation for legitimate carbon offsets – real, independently verifiable, long-term or permanent, and additive.[9]

In contrast to legally mandated actions to reduce GHG emissions, there is also an entire market based on voluntary action to offset GHG emissions of an individual or an entire corporation or organized entity. Basically, these are offsets bought by companies for public relations and marketing reasons or by consumers to make them feel better about their carbon footprint. As early as 2006, the global market for sales of voluntary carbon offsets was over a $100 million.[10] Since that time, the market has fluctuated between $146 and $790 million per year, with a cumulative total of $6.7 billion in global sales of voluntary carbon offsets as of November 2021.[11]The most concerning voluntary carbon offsets include those (1) purchased by large corporations (to offset their own GHG emissions), (2) sold by large corporations to consumers of their goods and services to offset the consumers’ apportioned GHG emissions from the goods and services purchased from the corporation,[12] and (3) sold by corporations to individuals and businesses to offset their own emissions unrelated to the selling corporation.

The first type includes corporations and other organizations voluntarily “seeking to green up their act.”[13] These could be spurred by a number of motivations, including “a sense of corporate social responsibility, a perceived market advantage in claiming voluntary carbon neutrality, or the potential advantage of pre-compliance” before the enactment of legal requirements.[14] A specific example is Nestle S.A.’s pledge to make its KitKat candy production carbon neutral by 2025.[15] Nestle’s plan includes “restoring forests and supporting a transition to regenerative agriculture “ and investing “in high quality offsetting based on natural climate solutions.”[16]An example of the second type – where a corporation shifts the burden to their customers to offset the corporation’s GHG emissions – is where Southwest Airlines, for an extra fee (based on aircraft type, fuel consumption, and flight distance), offers to invest your money in a project to offset the GHG emissions attributable to you from your flight (projects include a wind farm in Uruguay and forest protection in Haiti and Tlingit).[17] This example can be replicated for almost any business (assuming they can calculate, and apportion, the GHG emissions from their goods and services with reasonable accuracy). An example of the third type is where corporations, such as Native and Terrapass, sell carbon offsets to individuals and businesses to offset their own GHG emissions. Individuals or businesses provide information about their actions and carbon use and the corporations use algorithms to calculate the particular carbon footprint (in CO2eq). The business or individual then pays the corporation to invest in projects that, in theory, are intended to offset their GHG emissions on a one-to-one basis.Projects offered by Native and Terrapass include a wind farm in Crow Lake, South Dakota (Terrapass), a landfill gas capture project in Henrico County, Virginia (Terrapass), solar power projects in Cortez, Colorado and Forest City, Iowa (Native), and an “avoided grassland conversion” project in Prowers County, Colorado (Native).[18]

The Problem(s) with Carbon Offsets

Carbon offsets are not necessarily all a scam; despite a lack of widespread empirical data, one can safely assume that most carbon offset projects are real and verifiable. The question is whether a particular project, or a credit purchased in that project, regardless if it is legally mandated or voluntary, is effective – will it result in additional and long-term or permanent GHG emission removal, reduction, or avoidance without leakage?[19] Despite an entire industry of standard-setting and auditing organizations to provide review of carbon offset projects, the scientific evidence and investigative reporting generally indicate that most offset projects do not achieve their stated goals.[20]

A good example of a project that provided real, verifiable, long-term, and additional GHG emission avoidance, but failed to provide the stated corporate carbon offset goal, is the 56MW wind farm in Tuppadahalli, India.[21] The wind farm was built from 2010 to 2012 during the Kyoto Protocol enforcement period and was registered with the CDM.[22] As part of the CDM, Acciona, the farm’s owner, sold CERs to subsidize its business.[23] In early 2021, Delta Airlines announced it was going to be fully carbon neutral by spending money on sustainability efforts, including carbon offset projects.[24] At the same time, Delta announced that it had spent $30 million on carbon credits, some of which came from the Acciona wind farm in Tuppadahalli.[25] However, the problem is that the wind farm construction was completed nine years earlier and it had been profitably operating for nearly a decade.The money spent by Delta to purchase the carbon credits presumably went to Acciona as business profits, not as a subsidy for an otherwise unprofitable venture that was under threat of failure or closure.[26] At a minimum, Delta’s purchase of these CERs fails to provide any “additional” emissions reduction or avoidance than what would have occurred without their purchase because the money used to purchase the CERs did not increase the wind farm’s power capacity, electricity distribution, or life-span.

For a few examples of carbon offset projects that are laughably ineffective, and in some cases knowingly so by all involved, watch John Oliver’s 23-minute segment from August 2022 from “Last Week Tonight with John Oliver.”[27] Oliver highlights several offset projects including a private hunting club in New Jersey selling offsets to stop logging which it has no intention of ever allowing anyway, JP Morgan Chase purchasing offsets to prevent logging of an already protected nature preserve, and private landowners selling credits to defer logging for as little as one year. Accepting that some (if not most) carbon offset projects are not effective, the concern is that corporations are aware of this, yet make public statements to the contrary. And if it can be shown that a corporation knew, or should have known, that the project would, could, or did not achieve the offsetting goal, how can it be held accountable?

Options to regulate and impose civil penalties – SEC, CFTC, FTC

Corporations should be held accountable for false, misleading, and deceptive statements regarding carbon neutrality and carbon offsetting. Not only do these claims hurt the climate change battle – pursuit of carbon neutrality through ineffective carbon offsetting allows corporations to avoid taking meaningful and sustainable GHG emission reduction actions – they also create an unfair advantage over those companies who have taken the moral high ground and refused to engage in the charade. There are several federal agencies that could regulate these statements, including the SEC, the CFTC, and the FTC.

The SEC submitted its proposed regulation to “enhance and standardize climate related disclosures for investors” for notice and comment in March 2022.[28]The SEC has yet to announce the final regulations. However, it’s unclear that these new regulations will provide the basis to impose civil penalties on a corporation for false, misleading, and deceptive statements regarding carbon neutrality and carbon offsetting projects. More importantly, it is likely that once the final SEC regulations are announced, they will be challenged in federal court.[29] Given the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent holding in West Virginia v. EPA, it’s likely any challenge will raise the “major question doctrine” challenging whether Congress delegated to the SEC the authority to regulate corporate actions related to climate change.[30]

The CFTC has expressed recent interest in regulating the voluntary carbon market. In June 2022, the CFTC convened a discussion panel and invited market participants and experts to discuss issues surrounding carbon offsets, most importantly standardization.[31] Even more recently, seven Democratic party U.S. Senators wrote a letter to CFTC Chairman Rostin Behnam urging the CFTC to “pursue strong oversight” over the voluntary carbon offset market.[32] The Senators argued that the “CFTC should take concrete steps to implement rules … [that] include a clear definition of a carbon credit and a robust standard for auditing” and recommended that the CFTC pursue cases of fraud.[33] CFTC has authority to regulate the carbon market as it has jurisdiction over “derivatives products such as futures contracts based on offsets.”[34]

While the CFTC may present an opportunity to regulate some carbon offset claims, its jurisdiction is narrow and some (if not a significant portion) of offset projects may not qualify as derivatives products or futures contracts. More importantly, any meaningful action is too far away – on average it takes 4 to 8 years from regulation development to enforcement.[35] And the Senators’ letter acknowledges that the CFTC is still be in the early stages of regulation development – their first recommendation is that the agency investigate the current situation.[36]

The urgent need to reduce global GHG emissions and the United States’ commitment under the Paris Agreement, counsels that the federal government should pursue all presently available actions before engaging in the long process of promulgating new regulations. The best currently available option for enforcement action is under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA). Specifically, the FTCA makes it unlawful to use “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”[37] The FTC’s Green Guides, which the FTC declares are administrative interpretations of the FTCA that do not carry the force of law, contain a specific section on “Carbon Offsets.”[38]That section, published in 2012 revisions to the Green Guides, gives notice to corporations that statements related to carbon offsets can be false, misleading, or deceptive.[39] As such, the Guides advise corporations to “employ competent and reliable scientific and accounting methods to properly quantify claimed emission reductions.”[40]

Over the last seven years alone, the FTC and the Department of Justice have successfully pursued 20 cases to enforce the statutory basis for the Green Guides, demonstrating the viability of their enforcement.[41] Just this year, Kohl’s and Walmart settled complaints, for $2.5 and $3 million in civil penalties, respectively, for making deceptive and misleading environmental claims in their products.[42]

Ultimately, while the best enforcement action for false, misleading, or deceptive statements by corporations about carbon offsets may be through the SEC or the CFTC, those options are at least four years down the road. In order to make a positive effect today, the federal government should use the FTCA and the Green Guides to stop the carbon offset charade and impose penalties on those corporations making false, misleading, or deceptive statements.

*Lewis & Clark Law School L.L.M. Candidate in Environmental, Natural Resources, and Energy Law

Sources:

[1] 16 C.F.R. part 260 (2022).

[2] “Carbon offset.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/carbon%20offset. Accessed 27 Oct. 2022.

[3] Derik Broekhoff and Kathryn Zyla, Outside the Cap: Opportunities and Limitations of Greenhouse Gas Offsets, World Resources Institute Climate and Energy Policy Series 2 (2008) available at https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/outside_the_cap.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2022).

[4] See “Carbon offset” supra note 2 (carbon offset also defined as “a quantifiable amount of such an activity that may be bought, sold, or traded especially as part of a system to reduce pollutants in the atmosphere.”).

[5] “CO2eq” is shorthand for carbon dioxide equivalent emissions.For GHGs other than CO2, the CO2eq is calculated by multiplying the amount of emissions for the particular GHG by its global warming potential (GWP).GWP, which is determined based on scientific data and studies, represents a GHG’s global warming potential in reference to CO2.As such the GWP for CO2 is 1.0.GHGs that contribute more to global warming on a tonne-by-tonne basis, will have a GWP greater than 1.0.See Chris Wold, International Environmental Law 284-85 (2022) (self-published).

[6] Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 12, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148.

[7] Id. at Art. 3, Annex A, Annex B.

[8] Id. at Art. 12.

[9] See Broekhoff & Zyla supra note 3.“Enforceable” is also included as a key feature.The “additionality” of a project ensures that any GHG emission reduction, avoidance, or removal is additional to any that would have happened without the intervention of the project.See Broekhoff & Zyla supra note 3 at 2-3.A classic example of a project failing to provide additionality is where a project “protects” a forest from being cut down even though there was no actual plan or threat for the forest to be cut down.

[10] Maria Savasta-Kennedy, The Newest Hybrid: Notes Toward Standardized Certification of Carbon Offsets, 34 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 851, 852 (2009).

[11] Stephen Donofrio et al., Ecosystem Marketplace Insight Report, Markets in Motion: State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2021 Installment 1 3 (Sept. 15, 2021) available at https://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/publications/state-of-the-voluntary-carbon-markets-2021/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2022).

[12] Savasta-Kennedy at 851-853.

[13] Id. at 853.

[14] Id.

[15] Press Release, Nestle S.A. (Apr. 21, 2021) available at https://www.nestle.com/media/news/kitkat-carbon-neutral-2025-sustainability-efforts#:~:text=KitKat%2C%20one%20of%20the%20world’s,as%20part%20of%20the%20plan (last visited Oct. 27, 2022).

[16] Id.

[17] Southwest Airlines Co., Carbon Offset Program available at https://www.southwest.com/carbon-offset-program/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2022).

[18] Terrapass projects available at https://terrapass.com/projects/sustainable-living-projects (last visited 0ct. 28, 2022); Native projects available at https://native.eco/your-projects/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2022).

[19] “Leakage” occurs when the GHG emissions that are reduced or avoided by one project are simply transferred to another emission source.See Broekhoff & Zyla supra note 3 at 2.A basic example would be a forest protection project where the forest was originally slated or threatened to be cut down, but the project invested money to prevent that action on a long-term or permanent basis.Leakage would occur if the entity that was going to cut down the now protected forest, instead cut down trees from a different forest.In the end, little to no GHG emissions have been avoided or reduced (in fact, they could be even larger than they would have been without the project).

[20] Alex Fredman and Todd Phillips, The CFTC should raise standards and mitigate fraud in the carbon offset market (Oct. 7, 2022) available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-cftc-should-raise-standards-and-mitigate-fraud-in-the-carbon-offsets-market/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2022).

[21] Acciona inaugurates 56MW wind farm in India, Wind Energy and Electric Vehicle Magazine (May 31, 2012) available at https://www.evwind.es/2012/05/31/acciona-inaugurates-56-mw-wind-farm-in-india/18833 (last visited Oct. 28, 2022) (no author listed); Shane Shifflett, Are Carbon Credits Still Working?, The Wall Street Journal (Sep. 1, 2022) available at https://www.wsj.com/podcasts/the-journal/are-carbon-credits-still-working/e0e05149-ad60-4fdc-923a-679747afb63c (last visited Oct. 28, 2022).

[22] Id. (Shifflett article).

[23] Id.

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO broadcast Aug. 22, 2022) available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=6p8zAbFKpW0 (last visited Oct. 28, 2022).

[28] Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Proposes Rules to Enhance and Standardize Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors (Mar. 21, 2022) available at https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2022-46 (last visited Oct. 28, 2022); The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors, 87 Fed. Reg. 21,334 (proposed Apr. 11, 2022) (to be codified 17 C.F.R. part 200).

[29] Jacqueline Vallette and Kathryne Gray, SEC’s Climate Risk Disclosure Proposal Likely to Face Legal Challenges, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (May 10, 2022) available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/05/10/secs-climate-risk-disclosure-proposal-likely-to-face-legal-challenges/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2022).

[30] See id. (stating that litigants may argue the SEC’s proposed regulations exceeds the limits on regulating major policy questions); West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022) (holding that the EPA’s assertion of authority to substantially restructure the American energy market was subject to the major question doctrine and that Congress did not provide clear authority for the challenged regulation under the ancillary and gap-filler provision of the Clean Air Act used for authority by the EPA).

[31] See Press Release No. 8525-22, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC Announces Voluntary Carbon Markets Convening (May 11, 2022) available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8525-22 (last visited Oct. 28, 2022); Press Release No. 8539-22, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC Announces Agenda for the June 2nd Voluntary Carbon Markets Convening (Jun. 1, 2022) available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8539-22 (last visited Oct. 28, 2022); Fredman & Phillips supra note 20.

[32] Letter from Senator Corey Booker et al. to Chairman Rostin Behnam (Oct. 13, 2022), available at https://www.booker.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/letter_to_cftc_re_carbon_offsets_oct_2022.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2022).

[33] Id. at 2-3.

[34] Fredman & Phillips supra note 20.

[35] See WILLIAM FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 139-140 (rev. 6th ed. 2018) citing Testimony of Sidney A. Shapiro Before the Judiciary Committee. United States House of Representatives. Hearing on H.R. 3010, Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011 (Oct. 25, 2011) (Professor Shapiro outlined the various steps and the time attributed to each for a major/significant rule; this included 1-3 years for judicial review upon challenge in federal court).

[36] Senator Booker et al. Letter supra note 32 at 2.

[37] 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2022).

[38] See Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, FTC Issues Revised “Green Guides” (Oct. 1, 2012) (the Green Guides “take into account nearly 340 unique comments and more than 5,000 total comments received since the FTC released the proposed revised Guides in the fall of 2010”) available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2012/10/ftc-issues-revised-green-guides (last visited Oct. 28, 2022); Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, FTC The Green Guides: Statement of Basis and Purpose 9 (Oct. 1, 2012) (the Green Guides are “administrative interpretations of Section 5” of the FTCA) available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-issues-revised-green-guides/greenguidesstatement.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2022); 16 C.F.R. § 260.5 (2022).

[39] 16 C.F.R. § 260.5(a) (2022); see also Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,122 (Oct. 11, 2012) (supplementary information to the published regulations “advises marketers to have competent and reliable scientific evidence to support their carbon offset claims, including using appropriate accounting methods to ensure they are properly quantifying emission reductions”).

[40] 16 C.F.R. § 260.5(a) (2022).

[41] See Green Guides: Cases, Federal Trade Commission available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/topics/truth-advertising/green-guides (last visited Oct. 28, 2022).

[42] Id.

Direct Action and the First Amendment: Bottom-Up Activism and Top-Down Policy Change for Animals and the Environment

July 3, 2023 / Jamie McLaughlin*

For the first time in United States history, an environmental activist was shot and killed while protesting.Manuel Esteban Paez Terán, known as Tortuguita,[1] was a member of Defend Atlanta Forest, a loose knit group of environmental activists protesting the police training complex to be built within Weelaunee Forest, a green space just southeast of Atlanta, Georgia.[2]Tortuguita, a twenty-six-year-old nonbinary activist of Venezuelan descent, was shot and killed inside of their tent by law enforcement on the morning of Sunday, January 18, 2023.[3] Following the shooting, several other activists involved in the protest were placed under arrest and charged under Georgia state law as environmental terrorists.[4] Their direct actions included civil disobedience, camping in the forest to prevent its destruction, and alleged property crimes related to a protest march.

Harsh treatment and prosecution of environmental and animal activists is nothing new.In the 1980s, direct action environmental and animal advocates successfully impacted companies engaged in logging, animal research, fur, agriculture, and other industries, by calling attention to animal mistreatment and environmental degradation. These powerful industries retaliated by lobbying Congress to enact the federal Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA) of 1992, legislation designed to allow prosecution of activists who targeted companies engaged in harming animals and the environment.[5] Later, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a renewed focus on extremism provided industry the opportunity to leverage the existing legislation to pass a more restrictive Act.[6]The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act of 2006 (AETA)[7] amended and increased the scope of the AEPA.

The AETA expanded the potential victims covered under the Act and imposed new sentencing guidelines.Under the AETA, animal and environmental activists can be prosecuted as “terrorists” for what are essentially property crimes. The AETA serves to intimidate activists, chilling free speech and protest with the threat of a vague law that may brand an advocate as a terrorist. Shockingly, most people are unaware of the AETA’s existence. The AETA should be abolished, or at a minimum, the title of the Act should be modified to exclude “terrorism.”

Overcharging and Underdelivering

AETA prosecution overcharges animal and environmental activists, who if convicted, are branded terrorists for life, but is the United States safer as a result? Probably not. Advocating for or conducting illegal activities is sometimes part of direct action. However, while some direct actions are illegal, a reasonable person would not interpret them to be terrorist activities. As discussed below, both AETA, and its predecessor AEPA, go too far.

In U.S. v. Fullmer, defendants were charged under the AEPA for direct action against Huntingdon Life Sciences (“Huntingdon”).[8] While defendants were prosecuted under the AEPA (prior to the 2006 amendment creating the AETA), Fullmer illustrates the court’s interpretation of the Act. Huntingdon provided animal testing lab services for pharmaceutical, agricultural, veterinary and medical products. After an undercover activist obtained video of a lab worker abusing animals, including punching and shaking beagles who were being used as toxicity test subjects, activists targeted Huntingdon through direct action.

The activists were a loosely affiliated group known as Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (“SHAC”). The tactics they were prosecuted for included protesting, black faxing (faxing black pages to corporate fax machines to deplete the ink), phone calls, emails, letter writing, gluing locks shut, graffiti, and animal rescue (removing 14 beagles from a lab, and taking dogs and ferrets from a Huntingdon lab animal breeder). While property destruction, theft (animals are property under current US law), and these other activities may be illegal under certain circumstances, it is difficult to reasonably equate them with terrorism.

This is not to say that all illegal direct action fails to instill fear or terror, particularly for targeted individuals. In Fullmer, activists protested at the homes of targeted persons affiliated with Huntingdon, including partners, investors and insurers. More aggressive direct action included overturning an employee’s car, breaking ATMs, sinking a yacht, breaking windows of homes and offices, bomb threats, throwing paint, spraying cleaning fluid in one person’s eyes (resulting in no long-term damage), stalking, personal threats to family members, and even sending an undertaker to collect a (still living) target.

Aggressive direct actions such as these may not invoke sympathy for those being prosecuted, and may fit the dictionary definition of terrorism, but such actions are not the terrorism of our collective memory. We know terrorist activity when we see it: Lockerbie, Oklahoma City, September 11, too many mass shootings to list. Murderous intent was the common denominator of those terrorist acts. Real terrorist activities sharply contrast with the direct actions of animal and environmental activists. Yet, after SHAC members were convicted in Fullmer, Dr. John Young, chairman of the biomedical research organization Americans for Medical Progress, applauded harsh sentences imposed upon the young activists, stating “our nation’s law enforcement system will not tolerate terror tactics that include threatening e-mails, telephone calls, vandalism and attacks on the privacy of researchers’ homes.”[9] Labeling such activities as terrorism goes too far.[10]

The Terror is in the Title, and the Title Must Be Changed

The 1992 Animal Enterprise Protection Act was enhanced and renamed the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act in 2006. Although found in the Act’s 2006 revised title, the word “terrorism” is nowhere else used within the AETA. In United States v. Johnson, the Third Circuit determined that branding AETA violators as “terrorists” based on the title of the Act was not a violation of their substantive due process rights.[11] In Johnson, animal activists traveled from California to Illinois where they freed mink from cages on a fur farm, and damaged farm property. Defendants were charged under the AETA, and they contended that being labeled a terrorist for non-violent property crimes violated their substantive due process rights.[12]The court determined there is no liberty interest to not be labeled as a terrorist under the AETA. The court instead used rational basis analysis reasoning that being labeled a terrorist is a “harmless” non-fundamental liberty. The court noted that Congress intended that the AETA allow prosecution of direct action such as bombings, death threats, arson, and so the use of the word “terrorism” in the title of the statute was not arbitrary.[13] Although the Johnson activists committed non-violent acts, the AETA prosecutes both violent and non-violent acts. Thus, those convicted for non-violent acts are subjected to the AETA and labeled as terrorists due to the “terrorism” title.

Being convicted under a terrorism statute means that activists will have their cases reviewed by a government counter-terrorism employee who must determine what penal facility an AETA convict will be sent to.[14] In Johnson, prosecutors attempted to soft pedal this by noting that the person reviewing the case will consider the entirety of the circumstances in determining the facility and those convicted under the AETA are not automatically assigned to high security prison units.[15] However, overburdened prison system employees are prone to mistake. A Federal Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) 2020 audit indicates that the BOP frequently miscategorised the security risk of incoming inmates.[16] The audit indicated that over 300 international terrorists went undetected for enhanced monitoring during their incarceration.[17]This is because they were sent to prison for criminal charges not labeled as terrorist activities. More than 40 inmates who had a terrorism nexus were released by BOP “without notifying the FBI, because, according to the BOP, it did not believe it had sufficient information to consider these 40 individuals to be terrorist inmates.”[18]

Furthermore, the BOP “often had to rely on media coverage or an internet search to identify the individual’s ties to terrorism.”[19] BOP estimated that the terrorism nexus for between 80-90 percent of arriving inmates was discovered by “public record searches prior to or upon the individual’s arrival at BOP institutions.”[20]The Department of Justice recommended that the BOP create procedures to identify terrorists who require enhanced monitoring.[21] This audit indicates that the identification of which incarcerated individuals are labeled as terrorists is neither uniform nor accurate.

As such, it is entirely possible that in this overburdened system, an activist convicted under AETA will inadvertently be branded a terrorist. The BOP Designation and Sentence Computation Center (“DSCC”) determines the facility designation for all prisoners[22] taking into consideration management variables, public safety factors, level of security and supervision required.[23] The DCSS can assign inmates to Communication Management Units (“CMU”) which are reserved for certain prisoners, including those convicted of terrorism-related offenses.[24] CMUs subject prisoners to increased monitoring of mail and telephone communications, and limited live-monitored social visits.[25] Because there are only two CMUs in the US, anyone assigned there may end up far from friends and family. Therefore, prisoners labeled terrorists under the AETA risk designation to prisons where their communications and privileges are limited.

Liberty is a fundamental right, and prisoners deserve fair treatment in their confinement based on an accurate assessment of their status and their risk to others when in prison. Being branded a terrorist under the AETA merely because of its title may impact the liberty interest of those convicted under the statute in unfair ways given the range of quality of prisons and restrictions applied to certain types of prisoners. As discussed below, policy change is required to remove the word “terrorism” from the Act, thus avoiding undue burdens to the liberty interest of incarcerated persons branded as terrorists under the Act.

Both Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Change are Required

The overcharging potential of the AETA highlights the disconnect between existing policy and cultural shift. Both top-down policy change, and bottom-up cultural shifts are required in tandem to bring meaningful change for animals and the environment, while still protecting the rights of activists. This article recommends two changes:

First, the term terrorist should be removed from the AETA title. Statistics indicate that a terrorism label specifically for environmental and animal activists is unnecessary. The FBI Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism contains a category for animal rights and environmental violent extremism.[26] The October 2022 Assessment revealed that the animal and environmental activism category of domestic terrorism investigations by investigative classification totaled 1% of investigations for the years 2020 and 2021.[27] In contrast, 2021 investigations for racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism totaled 19%, anti-government or anti-authority violent extremism 38%, and anti-riot laws/civil unrest was 31% (due to the January 6 insurrection).[28] Clearly, based on this data, animal and environmental activists are not a high domestic terrorism threat.

It is possible that the harsh penalties imposed by the AETA are working, and that the decrease in activist prosecution is the direct result of the statute’s success. However, direct action on behalf of animals and the environment has changed drastically since 2006.Activists are using more creative techniques that garner public support. For example, the right to rescue is becoming a culturally acceptable concept, particularly when no violence is involved in removing an economically worthless but critically injured animal from certain death and disposal on a factory farm.[29] While such action is potentially subject to prosecution under the AETA, a jury will make the final decision.When faced with nonviolent activists, social injustice, or a critically injured animal that is certain to be thrown in the trash, a jury must apply the AETA as instructed. Reasonable jury members will struggle to find guilty of terrorism those activists who are charged for removing a dying animal or camping illegally. Removing terrorism from the Act’s title relieves this jury pressure and protects activists from being overcharged.

Second, and preferably, the AETA should be eliminated altogether to protect animal and environmental activists from being overcharged. Congress must be reminded of the difference between terrorists with murderous intent who pose an imminent threat, versus animal and environmental activists who may commit property crimes. Direct actions such as undercover investigation of breeding facilities, labs, slaughterhouses and factory farms are necessary to discover violations of animal welfare and environmental degradation when government agencies are either unable or unwilling to enforce.A recent undercover investigation by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (“PETA”) exposed numerous Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”) violations at the Envigo[30] beagle breeding facility in Cumberland, Virginia.[31] USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”) failed to enforce against Envigo after documenting over 60 AWA violations in four visits from July 2021 to March 2022.[32] Over half of the documented violations were categorized as direct or critical, with beagles facing immediate harm.[33]PETA’s undercover investigation ultimately led to a criminal investigation by the Department of Justice.

The AETA must be abolished to protect organizations and individuals who do this important work. Whether the solution is to amend the Act’s title, or to altogether abolish the AETA, public pressure should be brought to bear on Congress to make these changes.

Conclusion

Industry has successfully lobbied Congress to silence activists by creating lifetime personal consequences for individuals who dare to challenge industry practices. Yet animal and environmental activists have been using direct action for decades, slowly moving the needle on important issues. In 2006, Congress created an immediate, top-down policy shift by enacting the AETA to further benefit those industries that negatively impact animals and the environment. However, public reaction to direct action increasingly shows a bottom-up cultural shift favoring activism. Widespread support for brave direct action is on the rise, and it is just such cultural shifts in ideology that prove sustainable in the long term. It is time for Congress, with the stroke of a pen, to reverse their sweeping change that branded activists as terrorists.The AETA should be abolished, or at a minimum, the title of the Act must be amended to remove any reference to terrorism while creating clear parameters that do not infringe upon the First Amendment rights of activists.

*Lewis & Clark Law School L.L.M. Candidate in Environmental, Natural Resources, and Energy Law

Sources:

[1] James Factora, Queer “Cop City” Protestor Tortuguita Fatally Shot by Law Enforcement in Atlanta, THEM (Jan. 23, 2023), https://www.them.us/story/tortuguita-shot-killed-atlanta-police-cop-city.

[2] Kiara Alfonseca, What is Atlanta’s ‘Cop City’ and Why are People Protesting It?, ABC (Jan. 29, 2023), 6:03 AM, https://abcnews.go.com/US/atlantas-cop-city-people-protesting/story?id=96716095.

[3] Steven Donziger, Environmentalist Manuel Esteban Paez Terán’s Death is Part of a Disturbing Trend, GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2023, 6:11 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/feb/02/manuel-esteban-paez-teran-climate-activist-killed-atlanta-police.

[4] Char Adams, What is ‘Cop City’? How Opposition to an Atlanta Police Center Prompted National Demonstrations, NBC (Jan. 26, 2023, 8:35 AM),https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/what-is-cop-city-atlanta-police-protests-rcna67291.

[5] 18 U.S.C. § 43. Force, violence, and threats involving animal enterprises.The Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992 was amended in 2006 and retitled the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act.

[6] John E. Lewis, Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington DC (May 18, 2004)https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/animal-rights-extremism-and-ecoterrorism. Assistant FBI Director Lewis testified before Congress, claiming that new legislation was needed to prosecute animal and environmental “terrorists.”

[7] 18 U.S.C. § 43.

[8] 584 F.3d 132 (2009).

[9] Laura Mansnerus, Animal Rights Advocates Given Prison Terms, NY TIMES (Sept. 13, 2006) https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/13/nyregion/13animal.html.

[10] NGOs focused on Constitutional law and civil rights have opposed the AETA.See Animal Rights “Terrorism” Law Violates First Amendment, Attorneys Say, CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS (April 2, 2014), https://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-releases/animal-rights-terrorism-law-violates-first-amendment-attorneys-sayACLU Letter to Congress Urging Opposition to the Animal Enterprise Act, S. 1926 and H.R. 4239, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/letter/aclu-letter-congress-urging-opposition-animal-enterprise-act-s-1926-and-hr-4239?redirect=cpredirect/25620 (accessed March 13, 2023).

[11] United States v. Johnson, 875 F.3d 360, 372 (2017).

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] Office of the Inspector General U.S. Department of Justice, Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Monitoring of Inmate Communications to Prevent Radicalization 9 (March 2020), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/reports/a20042.pdf.

[17] Id.

[18] Id. at i.

[19] Id. at 10.

[20] Id..

[21] Id. at 10-11.

[22] Custody and Care: Designations, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_and_care/designations.jsp (accessed March 13, 2023).

[23] Legal Resource Guide to the Federal Bureau of Prisons, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS 17 (2019), https://www.bop.gov/resources/pdfs/legal_guide_march_2019.pdf.

[24] Id. at 19.

[25] Id.

[26] Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION

DEPT. HOMELAND SEC. (Oct. 2022),

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-10/22_1025_strategic-intelligence-assessment-data-domestic-terrorism.pdf.

[27] Id. at 20.

[28] Id.

[29] Farhad Manjoo, Rescuing Farm Animals From Cruelty Should Be Legal, NY TIMES (Feb. 14, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/14/opinion/foster-farms-chicken-slaughterhouse-animal-cruelty.html.

[30] Envigo was acquired by Inotiv in Nov. 2021.See Inotiv, Inc. completes purchase of Envigo, INOTIV, https://www.inotivco.com/news/inotiv-inc-completes-purchase-of-envigo (accessed March 13, 2023).

[31] Desperate Dogs Warehoused and Bred in Prison-Like Factory That Sells Them for Experimentation, PETA,https://investigations.peta.org/dog-beagle-breeding-mill-envigo/ (accessed March 13, 2023).

[32] Sarah N. Lynch & Rachael Levy, Exclusive: US Probe of Dog Breeder Scrutinizes Why USDA Left Thousands of Beagles to Suffer, REUTERS (March 9, 2023)https://www.reuters.com/legal/us-probe-beagle-breeder-envigo-scrutinizes-top-animal-welfare-officials-inaction-2023-03-09/.

[33] Id.

A Better Way to Right Environmental Wrongs: Defining “Overburdened Community” in State Environmental Justice Statutes

June 29, 2023 / Clay Hill*

Washington State’s environmental justice ambitions are being thwarted by an unworkable state statutory definition of “overburdened community,” that should be supplanted by New Jersey’s definition of the same concept. After providing a high-level introduction to environmental justice and overburdened communities, this article analyzes these two state definitions of overburdened community (OBC) for their ability to deliver measurable results across three attributes of environmental justice: (1) procedural protection for the OBC, (2) substantive protection for the OBC, and (3) substantive remediation for the OBC—that is, obtaining a greater share of public investment that aims to provide environmental or public health benefits. While there are flaws in New Jersey’s definition that will be discussed, ultimately, its definition proves the better public policy lever because it is more easily administered, provides greater transparency, accountability, and susceptibility to ongoing performance evaluation.

Definition of Environmental Justice

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency defines environmental justice as “the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies.”[1] Washington State uses this EPA definition, but augments it by adding a second sentence that focuses on remedial action: “Environmental justice includes addressing disproportionate environmental and health impacts in all laws, rules, and policies with environmental impacts by prioritizing vulnerable populations and overburdened communities, the equitable distribution of resources and benefits, and eliminating harm.”[2] This additional sentence came from the Final Report of a Washington State Environmental Justice Task Force, which noted the task force wanted agencies in the state to achieve these stated outcomes.[3]

The Washington State definition of environmental justice encompasses three goals. The first goal is to provide procedural protection the meaningful engagement of overburdened communities in decision-making. The second goal is to provide substantive protection. This means preventing unfair treatment in the form of disproportionate adverse impacts from pollution-causing commercial or industrial sites, or government infrastructure and programs. The third goal is substantive remediation through a more equitable distribution of public investment in overburdened communities.

This article will explore the benefits and advantages of the Washington and New Jersey definition of OBC across those three objectives of environmental justice.

Washington Law

In April of 2021, the Washington state legislature passed the Healthy Environment for All (HEAL Act). This landmark legislation created a new chapter in state environmental law.[4] The purpose of the law is to reduce environmental and health disparities.[5] The intent section cites a compelling state interest in preventing and addressing those disparities through changes in the administration of environmental laws and the allocation of funding “to remedy the effects of past disparate treatment of overburdened communities and vulnerable populations.”[6]Substantively, among other provisions, the law required specified agencies to conduct environmental justice assessments for significant agency actions, and to create and adopt a community engagement plan to obtain input from overburdened communities.[7]

In the same 2021 legislative session, Washington passed the Climate Commitment Act (CCA),[8] an economy-wide cap-and-invest regulation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the auction of covered emission allowances. The CCA provides that a “minimum of not less than 35 percent and a goal of 40 percent” of the investments from carbon emission allowance auctions “provide direct and meaningful benefits to vulnerable populations within the boundaries of overburdened communities.”[9]The Seattle Times reported that the CCA’s quarterly allowance auctions would produce state revenue of $1.7 billion in the first two-years. As discussed below, the first full biennial operating, transportation, and capital budgets of Washington State enacted subsequent to the landmark HEAL Act and CCA, appropriate $2 billion from CCA revenue[10]. Therefore, what is at stake for overburdened communities is $800 million the 2023-25 fiscal biennium.[11]

Sadly, the state will never be able to comply with the requirements to distribute auction revenues in this way because of its definition of “overburdened communities.” The definition is so flawed that it is impossible to measure progress in those communities over time, and those communities will never be able to hold lawmakers accountable for any failure to remedy environmental health disparity.

Washington defined “overburdened community” in a way that is practically impossible to manage and unravel. An overburdened community is defined as a geographic area where vulnerable populations face combined, multiple environmental harms and health impacts, and includes, but is not limited to, highly impacted communities as defined in RCW 19.405.020.[12] [Emphasis added to signify statutorily defined terms]. This definition is difficult to administer because of the web of interrelated statutory definitions, many of which include open-ended language that make mapping a geographic area with static boundaries impossible.

For example, a vulnerable population is defined to be any number of racial or ethnic minorities and any size low-income population, and the definition has the open-ended phrasing “including, but is not limited to.”[13]The statute states:

“Vulnerable populations” means population groups that are more likely to be at higher risk for poor health outcomes in response to environmental harms, due to: (i) Adverse socioeconomic factors, such as unemployment, high housing and transportation costs relative to income, limited access to nutritious food and adequate health care, linguistic isolation, and other factors that negatively affect health outcomes and increase vulnerability to the effects of environmental harms; and (ii) sensitivity factors, such as low birth weight and higher rates of hospitalization.

(b) “Vulnerable populations” includes, but is not limited to:

  • (i) Racial or ethnic minorities;
  • (ii) Low-income populations;
  • (iii) Populations disproportionately impacted by environmental harms; and
  • (iv) Populations of workers experiencing environmental harms.

Next, one must try to determine whether one of those vulnerable populations has experienced combined, multiple environmental harms—an inquiry which requires a full historical investigation and a forward-looking projection because of the definition:

“Environmental harm” means the individual or cumulative environmental health impacts and risks to communities caused by historic, current, or projected:

  • (a) Exposure to pollution, conventional or toxic pollutants, environmental hazards, or other contamination in the air, water, and land;
  • (b) Adverse environmental effects, including exposure to contamination, hazardous substances, or pollution that increase the risk of adverse environmental health outcomes or create vulnerabilities to the impacts of climate change;
  • (c) Loss or impairment of ecosystem functions or traditional food resources or loss of access to gather cultural resources or harvest traditional foods; or
  • (d) Health and economic impacts from climate change.

An overburdened community also includes, but is not limited to, any highly impacted community:

“Highly impacted community” means a community designated by the department of health based on cumulative impact analyses in RCW 19.405.140 or a community located in census tracts that are fully or partially on “Indian country” as defined in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1151.[14]

In sum, this definition of overburdened community has multiple structural problems that make administration difficult. The definition references three other defined terms: vulnerable population, environmental harm, and highly impacted community. Each of these definitions is difficult to work with. Although, the Healthy Environment for All (HEAL) Act is clear that overburdened communities are to be “geographic areas,” and the CCA, passed the same year, emphasizes that at least 35 percent of revenue is to be invested “within the boundaries” of these overburdened communities, the peculiar drafting of the law makes it exceptionally difficult to map and identify those communities under the criteria in the statutory definition.

Remarkably, fully two-years after passage of the CCA and the HEAL Act, the Washington State Operating Budget for 2023-25 was passed with budget appropriations directing the Department of Ecology to create a process to track state agency CCA expenditures, including the amount of each expenditure that provides benefits to overburdened communities.[15] The Operating Budget also contained an amendment to the HEAL Act, which among other things, requires state agencies to coordinate with Ecology and the Office of Financial Management to achieve the statutory goal of 35 to 40 percent.[16]The 2023-25 Operating Budget, Transportation Budget, and Capital Budget, the first biennial budgets passed subsequent to the HEAL Act, spend CCA dollars without being able to account in any way for amounts that will impact OBCs. Summary documents available to the public for each budget (Operating, Transportation, and Capital) describe CCA spending by project or program, without reference to geographic areas.[17]

The bottom line is that after the first round of spending of CCA dollars there will be no way to know what percentage went to OBCs, there was no outreach to identifiable OBCs for meaningful input and participation in decision-making on the spending, and no viable way to measure environmental or public health impacts to OBCs from these appropriations exists.

In contrast, as discussed below, New Jersey’s laws relating to environmental justice issues provide much clearer parameters.

New Jersey Law

New Jersey defined “overburdened community” to mean any census block group, as determined in accordance with the most recent United States Census, in which: (1) at least 35 percent of the households qualify as low-income households; (2) at least 40 percent of the residents identify as minority or as members of a State recognized tribal community; or (3) at least 40 percent of the households have limited English proficiency. N.J.S.A. 12:1D-158.

The ability to map the boundaries of an overburdened community is critical for all three components of environmental justice: procedural protection, substantive protection, and remedial action. A state agency cannot conduct effective outreach to solicit meaningful involvement in decision-making without knowing the boundaries of the neighborhoods in which to seek public participation. Neither state agencies, third-party researchers or advocates can evaluate fair treatment of a community without being able to locate and define the boundaries of the community. Finally, evaluating whether environmental conditions have improved requires assessing a baseline in an area and gathering data over time from the same area.

New Jersey’s definition facilitates all three of these critical components of environmental justice. The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection had a website with a map of census tracts meeting the state law definition of overburdened community up and running within 90 days of enacting its statute.

Washington State, by contrast, has no map completed two years after the April 2021 enactment of the HEAL Act.[18]

One downside of the New Jersey approach is that the criteria have nothing to do with environmental harm, and everything to do with demographic data. As such, a predominantly white, English-speaking community that had disproportionate impacts from polluting facilities—if it existed, would go unmapped under the New Jersey approach, but presumably would be captured under the Washington approach.

Another negative of the New Jersey law is that one cannot lift a community out of overburdened community status through environmental performance, only demographic change. In order to escape the designation of OBC, the community would have to gentrify (wealthy people moving in), homogenize ethnically (more than 60% must identify as other than minority or tribal identity), or homogenize linguistically (more than 60% must be English proficient).

There could be some disadvantages of importing the New Jersey definition to Washington without changes. Washington State, like most Western states, has some very large rural census tracts in which dissimilar environmental conditions may exist. With a census-tract approach relatively under-burdened communities may receive benefits. However, this can be ameliorated. For such communities, appropriators can draw eligibility guidelines for grant programs more narrowly—for example, that an agency should award riparian habitat improvement grants only in the eastern half of the census tract if that area is lacking these resources as compared to the western half. Another approach could be to designate subunits within census tracts over a certain size (for example, 400 square miles) and to then evaluate each subunit separately for eligibility as an “overburdened community.” Alternatively, for any census tract larger than X (400 sq. miles) subunits must be designated and evaluated separately for eligibility to be designated as an “overburdened community” (such that X, becomes X1, X2, X3, and X4 community). The only downside of this approach is that census tracts are supposed to have the benefit of roughly equal population, and this process would produce overburdened communities that are theoretically eligible for state funds equal to a census tract community while being a fraction of the population.

On balance, Washington should amend its statue to be more like New Jersey. The funding at stake is substantial, and the express legislative intent was for a quantifiable amount of money to be directed to geographic areas that have experienced environmental harms and achieve a more equitable distribution of benefits.

Conclusion

Nearly two years after enactment of the HEAL Act, Washington state executive branch agencies each claim that the identification of an overburdened community must occur on a case-by-case basis, changing for each program and grant opportunity. No overburdened community has been mapped. By contrast, New Jersey used a definition involving census tracts, quantifiable measures for identifying those census tracts from an identified data source—the U.S. Census. Significantly, New Jersey required agencies to publish a list of overburdened communities within 120 days of the enactment of its environmental justice law. N.J.S.A 13:13-159 (requiring a list of overburdened communities on a public website). This creates transparency, accountability, and the ability to monitor and evaluate performance on environmental health metrics from a known baseline. Washington State should recognize that there is a better way to identify overburdened communities and deliver environmental justice. The old adage pertains, you cannot manage what you cannot measure, and at the present time Washington State cannot measure how much spending is going to OBCs.

 

*Lewis & Clark Law School L.L.M. Candidate in Environmental, Natural Resources, and Energy Law

 

[1] See https://epa.gov/environmentaljustice

[2] RCW 70A.02.010(8).

[3] Washington State Environmental Justice Task Force Final Report (Fall 2020), p. 6. Available at https://apps.leg.wa.gov/ReportsToTheLegislature/Home/GetPDF?fileName=EJTF%20Report_FINAL_39bdb601-508e-4711-b1ca-6e8c730d57bf.pdf

[4] RCW 70A.02.

[5] RCW 70A.02.005.

[6] RCW 70A.02.005(3).

[7] RCW 70A.02.060 (Environmental justice assessment); RCW 70A.02.050 (Community engagement).

[8] Washington State Engrossed Second Substitute Senate Bill 5126 (2021).

[9] RCW 70A.65.230(1)(a).

[10] E-mail from Dan Jones, Senior Fiscal Analyst, Washington State Legislature Office of Program Research (April 23, 2023) (on file with author). See also, Climate Commitment Act (CCA) Accounts Balance Seet, 2023-25 Budget Conference, available at: https://fiscal.wa.gov/statebudgets/2023proposals/Documents/co/codCCAFund%20Balance2023-25Bien-ConferenceProposal.pdf (showing total 2023-25 expenditures across operating, capital, and transportation budgets of $2,079,601,000).

[11] Isabella Breda, WA’s First Greenhouse-gas-allowance auction raises estimated $300 million, The Seattle Times, (March 7, 2023), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/was-first-greenhouse-gas-allowance-auction-raises-estimated-300-million/

[12] RCW 70A.02.010(11).

[13] RCW 70A.02.010(14).

[14] RCW 19.405.020.

[15] Senate Bill 5187, Section 302(13).

[16] Senate Bill 5187, Section 936.

[17] See, Operating Budget Summary at p. 30, available at: https://fiscal.wa.gov/statebudgets/2023proposals/Documents/co/cohSummary.pdf; Capital Budget Summary: at p.41-43, available at: https://fiscal.wa.gov/statebudgets/2023proposals/Documents/cc/ccHouseProposedCompromiseBudgetSummary042123.pdf; 2023-25 Transportation Budget Climate Commitment Act Spending Summary, available at: https://fiscal.wa.gov/statebudgets/2023proposals/Documents/ct/ctClimateCommitmentActSpending2023-25Budget.pdf

[18] E-mail from Adam Eitmann, Government Relations Director, Washington State Department of Ecology (Feb. 17, 2023) (on file with the author).

The Escazu Agreement and the Rights of Nature in the LAC Region

June 25, 2023 / Alexander Ramdass

The Latin American and the Caribbean region (LAC) is geographically and ecologically one of the most diverse regions on the planet. It has more than 5 million kilometers of arable land; 20 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves, 23% of the world’s forested areas, 60/70% of all lifeforms on Earth, and it receives 29% of all earth’s rainfall. The wide range of biodiversity, including ecosystems, and other assets such as minerals and land found in the region, offer opportunities and the potential to support livelihoods and a good quality of life to its population of over 600 million people at all scales well into the future.[1] However, despite their ever increasing dependence on the environment, countries in the LAC region have not had the best track record as far as environmental preservation is concerned. Between 2010-2020 the Food Agriculture Organization estimated that South America lost an average of 2.6 million hectares of forest per year.[2] In fact, as of 2021 it was estimated that nearly 35% of the Amazon rainforest has been deforested.[3] Further, more than 8000 endemic plants and 2300 animals are at a high risk of extinction.[4] The region’s ocean management also leaves a lot to be desired as studies have measured the concentrations of plastic waste in the Caribbean sea to be around 200,000 pieces of plastic per square kilometer.[5]

Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean (Escazu Agreement). The Escazu was considered a “win” by many in the civil sector not only for the increased protections and access to information it provided them, but also because it was the first pronouncement on a right to a healthy environment at a regional level. Collectively, Articles 4(1)-(3) of the Agreement require that all member states; (1) recognize the right to a healthy environment, (2)ensure that the right is freely exercised and (3)adopt legislative/regulatory measures in their domestic provisions to guarantee the right’s implementation.[8] Justice Winston Anderson of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) was among many who saw the value of the agreement’s adoption, remarking that it represented an affirmation of the Caribbean’s commitment to respecting environmental rights and its adherence to sustainable development.[9] Despite the Agreement’s magnanimity, the results of such a bold declaration have yet to be observed in the region. Rates of deforestation continue to rise; endangered species remain endangered, and our oceans are no less polluted.[10] While some may point to the failures of regional Governments to effectively implement the principles of the Escazu Agreement as an explanation for the region’s abysmal record, the problem may not be that simple. From inception, the notion of a right has been perceived as something which is intrinsically human. This much is observed by the preamble to United Declaration of Human Rights where on several occasions the notion of a right is tied to concepts such as human dignity and equality and that humans are born with these rights by virtue of simply existing.[11] It is from the concept of a human oriented right that much of our laws have developed, including those laws that concern how humans interact with nature. As the world approaches several climate tipping points[12] and we appear to be heading towards an ecological disaster the likes of which we’ve never experienced, it is perhaps high time that we revaluate the longstanding notion of a right as something that is tied to being intrinsically human. For far too long, we have relied on an outmoded framework of environmental regulation that considers nature to be composed of separate and independent parts, rather than components of a larger whole. Nature, especially in the LAC region, should no longer be subordinate to economic interests and instead, it should have a right to thrive and benefit from human civilization.

Before we examine nature’s case for legal personage, it is prudent to look at the right to a healthy environment as it exists in the LAC region presently. The right to a healthy environment implies the sustainable, moderate use of earth’s natural resources while focusing on protection and conservation, including the flora and fauna and the collateral conditions for its creation.[13] In 2021 the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) recognized the right to a healthy environment as a universal human right, noting that, “A clean, healthy and sustainable environment is essential for our survival. A stable climate is a precondition for good harvests and food security, for economic well-being and progress on human development. Sustainably managing, preserving and restoring healthy ecosystems and the rich biodiversity upon which healthy lives and livelihoods depend is critical to a development trajectory that ensures no one is left behind.”[14] The UNGA notes that at present, 150 countries have recognized the right to a healthy environment in some form in their domestic legal systems. This includes many countries in the LAC region.[15]

The Escazu Agreement provides a great benchmark for evaluating the success of “right to a healthy environment” laws in LAC region. A recent study found that an overwhelming majority of respondents, hailing from civil society and other key stakeholder groups, believe that coordination between state-led initiatives and rights-holders’ initiatives aiming to address healthy environment challenges is somewhat insufficient, with the average ranking of 4.3 on a scale of 0 to 10.[16] Regional activists, particularly those in the Commonwealth Caribbean have also been very slow in adopting the right to a healthy environment in their respective litigation effort and when they have done so, they have been met with varying degrees of success. For example, in CAL v. Attorney General (2007) a Belizean Court accepted that the government’s failure to recognize and protect Mayan interests in their traditional lands violated the security of their being, compromised their right to life, and denied them the protection of the law under the Belizean Constitution.[17] Conversely, in the Trinidadian case of Fishermen and Friends of the Sea v. The Environmental Management Authority and Atlantic LNG (2004), a judge disagreed that an illegal grant of a certificate of environmental clearance could breach the constitutional rights of residents to life, protection of the law, and respect for family and private life since the granting of constitutional rights was a matter for Parliament.[18]

At the core of the difficulty in enforcing the right to a healthy environment is the inevitable trade off which occurs when Courts are tasked with balancing rights. Rights are not absolute things, often they conflict with each other and can be limited by the State. Because the right to a healthy environment is so interwoven with the right to life, the right to a healthy environment is often forced to compete against other important aspects of human existence. Consider the statements of the Court in FFOS v. Atlantic LNG, “I am reluctant to elevate them or categorize them together with those rights entrenched in the Constitution, despite also accepting that the latter is a living document which should be interpreted generously. The position remains, however, as acknowledged in Europe and India, for example, that these “rights” are subject to other considerations…It is sufficient to say that issues of environmental control often involve the delicate balancing of competing social and economic interests, as well as the application of specialized expertise to the right to a healthy environment.”[19] As is observed, the right to a healthy environment is inevitably limited by the extent to which “a healthy environment” is commensurate with State policy and interest. It only provides protection within the parameters of human existence and as such, it is susceptible to being limited when said protections clash with other “important interests.”

If protection of the natural environment is a serious priority for the countries of the LAC region, the objectives of the Escazu Agreement will be more fruitfully realized should the contracting parties adopt a ‘Rights of Nature’ instead. According to the “Rights of Nature” doctrine, an ecosystem is entitled to legal personhood status and as such, has the right to defend itself in a court of law against harms, including environmental degradation caused by a specific development project or even by climate change.[20] Unlike the right to a healthy environment, the Rights of Nature doctrine treats the environment as a separate legal entity deserving legal protection of its own. In this model, nature, like humans will be conferred with rights by virtue of its existence. As such, legislators, executive decision makers and the courts are no longer forced to grapple with the ‘competing social and economic interests’ that often limits the right’s effect, but instead are forced to contend with the inherent Rights of Nature, whose interests are not always in line with the advancement of human civilization. Already the ‘Right of Nature’ has been observed to be taking effect in some LAC jurisdictions. For example, in the Argentinian case of Asociación Civil por la Justicia Ambiental v. Province of Entre Ríos, et al[21] a group of children, filed a class action suit against the governments of the Province of Entre Ríos and the Municipality of Victoria City for their alleged failure to protect environmentally sensitive wetlands. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare the Paraná Delta a “subject of rights” and an essential ecosystem for mitigating and adapting to climate change, and to designate a “guardian” of the rights of the Paraná Delta who will be responsible for controlling the conservation and sustainable use of the wetlands. Another example is the Peruvian case of Alvarez et al v. Peru[22] where a group of Peruvian youths filed a suit seeking the recognition of the Peruvian Amazon as an entity subject to the rights of protection, conservation, maintenance, and restoration. Both cases are still pending.

Precedent for prescribing a ‘right to nature’ though minimal has begun to surface. For example, in the Indian case of Mohammed Salim v. State of Uttarakhand, the highest court in the state of Uttarakhanda, India declared the river Ganges (known as the Ganga in India) and its main tributary Yamuna as rights-bearing “living entities,” effectively granting them the legal status of personhood.[23]The Court laid down the rationale for conferring separate legal personhood onto “non human things.” Justice Rajiv Sharma notes “ With the development of the society where the interaction of individuals fell short to upsurge the social development, the concept of juristic person was devised and created by human laws for the purposes of the society. A juristic person, like any other natural person is in law also conferred with rights and obligations and is dealt with in accordance with law…This may be any entity, living inanimate, objects or things. It may be a religious institution or any such useful unit which may impel the Courts to recognize it.”

In the LAC region, there are numerous areas of environmental significance that are of such global importance, they are deserving of legal personhood. This includes, the Amazon Rainforest, the Caribbean Sea, the Andean Mountain ranges etc. These important global ecosystems should be conferred with legal personhood to protect their own interests. [24] By making this shift, the LAC environment will no longer fall victim to the “development trap” which forces so many countries in the global south to forgo environment protection in the pursuit of development. Instead, these countries will be required to pursue development in a manner which respects the right of the environment to exist. Moreover, this would bring the LAC authorities closer to meeting the mandates of the Escazu Agreement as it promotes a model of sustainable development and participation in environmental decision-making that fairly accommodates the environment and the communities which depend on the same decision-making by providing them proverbial “seat at the table” as opposed to being a consideration in host of socio-economic factors.

While the Rights of Nature doctrine has yet to take root in the world, much less the LAC region, the dire state of our environment requires that serious consideration be given to the concept as a means of protecting and preserving the environment.

*Lewis & Clark Law School L.L.M. Candidate in Environmental, Natural Resources, and Energy Law

 

[1]UNEP, Global Environmental Outlook, Regional Assessment for Latin America and the Caribbean (2016) UNON Publishing Services Section. Available At: GEO_LAC_201611.pdf (Accessed October 30, 2022)

[2]Illegal deforestation rises in South America’s Indigenous Territories, Parks (2021) Mongabay Environmental News. Available at: https://news.mongabay.com/2020/12/illegal-deforestation-rises-in-south-americas-indigenous-territories-parks/ (Accessed: October 30, 2022).

[3] Person and Stephen Eisenhammer, O.G. (2021) Over 10,000 species risk extinction in Amazon, says Landmark ReportReuters. Thomson Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/over-10000-species-risk-extinction-amazon-says-landmark-report-2021-07-14/ (Accessed: October 30, 2022).

[4] Person and Stephen Eisenhammer, O.G. (2021) Over 10,000 species risk extinction in Amazon, says Landmark Report, Reuters. Thomson Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/over-10000-species-risk-extinction-amazon-says-landmark-report-2021-07-14/ (Accessed: October 30, 2022).

[5] BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation). 2017. “The Giant Mass of Plastic Waste Taking over the Caribbean.” http://www.bbc. com/news/av/world-41866046/the-giant-mass-of-plastic-waste-taking-over-the-caribbean).

[6]Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Ecuador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Uruguay.

[7]Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Uruguay.

[8] Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Regional agreement on access to information, public participation and justice in environmental matters in Latin America and the CaribbeanEconomic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Available at: https://www.cepal.org/en/escazuagreement (Accessed: October 30, 2022).

[9] Why the Escazu Agreement Matters: Environmental Rights, Justice, and … (no date). Available at: http://www.ccj.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Public-Lecture-on-why-Escazu-Agreement-Matters_20200123.pdf (Accessed: October 30, 2022).

[10] ibid

[11]Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948). Available at: https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/2021/03/udhr.pdf (Accessed: October 30, 2022).

[12] World on brink of five ‘disastrous’ climate tipping points, study finds (2022) The Guardian. Guardian News and Media. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/sep/08/world-on-brink-five-climate-tipping-points-study-finds (Accessed: October 30, 2022).

[13]Víctor Rodríguez Rescia , The Right to a Healthy Environment in the Inter American System for the Protection of Human Rights:In Search of the implementation of a regional litigation strategy (2016) Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide, (Accessed October 30,2022)

[14] Katy Thompson Head of Rule of Law and Pradeep Kurukulasuriya Director and Executive Coordinator (2022) Historic UN resolution recognizes healthy environment is a human right: United Nations Development ProgrammeUNDP. Available at: https://www.undp.org/blog/historic-un-resolution-recognizes-healthy-environment-humanight?utm_source=EN&utm_medium=GSR&utm_content=US_UNDP (Accessed: October 30, 2022).

[15] Costa Rica, Dominica, El Salvador, Peru, Panama, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Argentina, Mexico, Dominica.

[16] UNEP, The Escazu Agreement and Human Rights: Human Rights and Healthy Ecosystems (2021)https://www.learningfornature.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/The-Esczau-Agreement-Human-Rights-and-Healthy-Ecosystems-Webinar-Series-Report.pdf (Accessed October 30, 2022)

[17]Aurelio Cal, et al. v. Attorney General of Belize, Supreme Court of Belize (Claims No. 171 and 172 of 2007) (18 Oct 2007) (Mayan land rights).

[18] H.C.A. Cv. 2148 of 2003

[19] H.C.A. Cv. 2148 of 2003

[20] 22, T.C.|A. et al. (2021) The rights of nature – can an ecosystem bear legal rights?State of the Planet. Available at: https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2021/04/22/rights-of-nature-lawsuits/ (Accessed: October 30, 2022).

[21] Ibid 19

[22]Ibid 19

[23] Salim v. State of Uttarakhand, Writ Petition (PIL) No.126 of 2014 (December 5, 2016 and March 20, 2017)
High Court of Uttarakhand

[24] Ibid 22

Seizing the Engines of Government Power: The Major Questions Doctrine and Limits of Judicial Review in the Roberts Juristocracy

June 19, 2023 / RYAN M. SWEENEY*

I. Introduction 

Recent headlines about railroads in the United States have reignited discussions about nationalizing the nation’s freight rail companies.[1] Discussions about broad new federal administrative power come at a unique time in American jurisprudence. The current conservative majority on the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts appears intent on tearing down the so-called “administrative state,” expanding the power of the judiciary in the process. The primary explosive for this judicial demolition is the major questions doctrine—expressly recognized for the first time in a majority opinion in West Virginia v. EPA[2]—which dramatically restructures the separation of powers by asserting nebulously expansive authority to strike down agency actions. If the administrative state is a train, Congress is the train’s owner and chairman of the board, and the President is the conductor, then West Virginia is the Supreme Court piling gravel on the tracks, hog-tying the conductor, robbing the passengers, and blowing up the engine with a stick of dynamite. Yet in another recent decision seeking to extend judicial power, Collins v. Yellen,[3] the Court implicitly recognized an existing statutory means for limiting judicial review of agency actions, which may provide a possible path around the major questions doctrine.

In Section II, this article will examine the Roberts Juristocracy, demonstrating the capricious nature of the current Court. Section III will explain how Collins highlights the Court’s implicit recognition of certain statutory mechanisms that limit judicial review over agency actions. Section IV will discuss some of the implications of the Collins model for practitioners in bypassing major questions review moving forward.

II. The Age of the Roberts Juristocracy

“Juristocracy” means rule or government by the judiciary. Although the principle of judicial review gives U.S. courts “the province and duty … to say what the law is,”[4] that power does not give the judiciary the authority to make law or prevent faithful execution of the law by arbitrary fiat. Like other common-law legal systems, U.S. judges must follow the principle of stare decisis, by which the judiciary seeks to establish consistency and predictability in the law, ensuring that similar facts will yield foreseeable outcomes.[5]

Several recent decisions by the Supreme Court indicate its intent to abandon those principles. In its decisions attacking the authority of administrative agencies, the current conservative majority of the Supreme Court has ostensibly sought to rebalance the separation of powers in line with the Constitution[6]—explicitly discussing the allegedly appropriate rebalancing of these powers only between the legislative and executive branches.[7] But the Roberts majority has done so through questionably vague and unpredictable decisions, creating new legal doctrines out of whole cloth and giving short shrift to the bedrock principle of stare decisis. In these decisions, the Roberts majority has failed to mention or address their practical effect: the judiciary’s seizure of legislative and executive power from the other branches.[8]

A. The major questions doctrine

Existing precedent acknowledged the judiciary’s limited role in reviewing agency decisions. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Court acknowledged that whenever it encountered an agency decision based on a statute that was silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the judiciary must defer to an agency’s “permissible construction of the statute.”[9] Chevron deference was based on principles of judicial restraint, noting that in encountering a statute that was ambiguous or silent about a specific agency action, “the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute.”[10]

The major questions doctrine throws judicial restraint out the window. The issue in West Virginia was whether the EPA had authority under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act to use generation shifting in setting state limits on carbon dioxide emissions.[11] In holding that the statute did not give EPA the required authority and that its regulatory action was unconstitutional, the majority opinion drafted by Chief Justice Roberts described the major questions doctrine as follows: “Courts expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast economic and political significance.… [I]n certain extraordinary cases … the agency must point to ‘clear congressional authorization’ for the power it claims.”[12] Importantly, Chevron is never mentioned in the decision.[13]

According to Professor David M. Driesen, the major questions doctrine “has nothing to do with preserving self-government and everything to do with increasing the reach of the juristocracy.”[14] The rule is light on particulars, vague and broad in its language, and incapable of being used as a meaningful benchmark. The majority did not clearly define what makes a case “extraordinary” or what makes congressional authorization “clear.”[15] Roberts’s attempts to define or break down this rule into its elemental parts wound up using other similarly vague, conclusory terms—“extravagant power over the national economy,” “radical or fundamental change,” “major policy decision”[16]—creating a Russian nesting doll out of the law. What does it mean for an agency’s assertion of power to be “extravagant,” for a regulatory change to be “radical or fundamental,” or for a policy decision to be “major”?[17] The majority is silent on these apparently minor details.

Because of its lack of clarity, West Virginia created tremendous uncertainty about how the federal government will work moving forward. Considering the significant discretion afforded the judiciary in reviewing agency actions, attorneys around the country could be forgiven for wondering whether the Roberts Juristocracy will simply use its major questions wrecking ball to target agency actions that may offend its conservative ideology (e.g., regulations tangentially connected to fighting climate change, including Treasury Department regulations classifying various materials eligible for EV-tax credits, EPA regulations on vehicle emissions standards, or SEC regulations requiring disclosure of financial risks related to climate), or if it will go further to strike down any agency action that is not explicitly directed by Congress in painstaking detail.

B. Seila Law & Collins

A pair of cases decided shortly before West VirginiaSeila Law, LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau[18] and Collins v. Yellen[19]—dealt an additional blow to the administrative state in a way that demonstrates the capriciousness of the Roberts Juristocracy. In Seila Law and Collins, the Court considered the constitutionality of for-cause removal restrictions on agencies led by a single presidentially appointed officer, the director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in Seila Law and the director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) in Collins.[20] Prior to these cases, Congress had authority to establish agencies led by single individuals that had an additional layer of protection from the executive branch.[21] The Court held that these for-cause removal restrictions were unconstitutional, in doing so shifting the removal power from Congress to the President.[22]

Seila Law established standards for when Congress would be permitted to grant removal protections to agency officials, specifically finding that the single director of the CFPB could not enjoy for-cause removal protection because he “wield[ed] significant executive power.”[23] In Collins, the Court commissioned Professor Aaron L. Nielson as amicus to defend the FHFA’s for-cause provision because the federal parties had declined to contest the circuit court’s findings on the issue.[24] The Court agreed with Professor Nielson that the director of the CFPB exercised more executive power than the director of the FHFA.[25] However, abrogating its explicit standard from Seila Law, the Court wrote that “the nature and breadth of an agency’s authority is not dispositive in determining whether Congress may limit the President’s power to remove its head.”[26] Although Professor Nielson asserted that the Court’s own standard from Seila Law should hold[27]i.e., that an agency must exercise “significant executive power” before the President’s removal authority applies—the Court responded that amicus “[did] not propose any clear standard to distinguish agencies.”[28] This despite the fact that the standard proposed by amicus that the Court found unclear in June 2021 was the Court’s own standard from its decision in June 2020.[29]

III. Collins highlights a possible path around the major questions doctrine

Collins also addressed the question whether an agency granted “expansive authority” by statute violated that statute when it nationalized for-profit companies. After the housing market collapsed in 2008, Congress passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA).[30] HERA created a new entity, FHFA, tasked with regulating the for-profit entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and stepping in as their conservator if necessary.[31] After FHFA placed Fannie and Freddie into conservatorships and negotiated agreements giving preferred ownership shares to the Treasury Department in exchange for capital influxes, private shareholders sued.[32] The shareholders alleged that the new agency exceeded its authority under HERA.[33] The Supreme Court’s answer offers an important implicit acknowledgement of judicial restraint. The Court held that the shareholders’ claim was barred by HERA’s anti-injunction clause, which states: “no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the Agency as a conservator or a receiver.”[34] The Court found that this clause “sharply circumscribed judicial review of any action that the FHFA takes as a conservator or receiver.”[35] The Court went on to uphold this restraint on judicial review after finding FHFA’s actions were well within HERA’s grant of “expansive authority [to FHFA] in its role as a conservator.”[36]

This finding is consistent with a line of cases establishing the sovereign immunity of the United States and its agencies unless Congress has consented to suit.[37] Congress has waived sovereign immunity to suit in several instances, including the Tucker Act, Federal Tort Claims Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act, but has also provided exceptions to those waivers by enacting more specific statutory provisions limiting judicial review, such as HERA’s anti-injunction clause.[38]

If the Supreme Court planned to find that anti-injunction clauses are unconstitutional under the major questions doctrine, it could have easily done so in Collins. The Court in Collins was composed of the same nine justices as in West Virginia, and Collins was decided after the cases that the West Virginia majority adopted as ex post facto major questions doctrine cases. The cases upholding provisions limiting judicial review were established precedent by the time the Roberts Juristocracy took hold. The Court has a duty to consider the constitutionality of acts of Congress sua sponte.[39] The fact that the Court did not do so in Collins, despite the exact same composition and the precedent necessary to adopt the major questions doctrine just a year later, suggests that it will not disturb Congress’s authority to limit judicial review of agency decisions. Challenging that authority would also require striking down important sections of the longstanding Administrative Procedure Act.[40]

IV. Implications of the Collins model limiting judicial review under the Roberts Juristocracy

Congress has an opportunity to rebalance the separation of powers, recapturing legislative and executive authority that was seized by the ideologues of the Roberts Juristocracy. In passing future legislation delegating broad authority to administrative agencies, legislators and their staffs should make a habit of considering anti-injunction clauses or similar provisions limiting judicial review. Similarly, federal attorneys drafting agency regulations—or engaged in other quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial, or executive actions on behalf of agencies—or defending agency actions from possible major questions review in court would do well to scour the agencies’ authorizing statutes to identify anti-injunction clauses or similar provisions that either directly limit judicial review or can be interpreted as such.

Nevertheless, uncertainties remain. Assumptions of internal consistency may not stop a rogue judiciary that disdains even its own precedent. The Roberts Juristocracy could seek to strike down a future anti-injunction clause as violating the major questions doctrine by distinguishing Collins in some way. For example, the Court might take advantage of the wide discretion offered by its vague new rule by saying that Collins did not deal with an “extraordinary case.” Or the Court may find that the broad statutory direction to FHFA to act as conservator was not so broad as to create an ambiguity requiring interpretation under the major questions doctrine, as in West Virginia. Given the Court’s capriciousness, it could find some as-yet unknown means of striking down a future anti-injunction clause, either using the enormous net of the major questions doctrine or another tenuous legal theory.

V. Conclusion

The Roberts Juristocracy and its newly adopted major questions doctrine pose existential threats for administrative agencies, in addition to posing serious concerns for the American people who rely on the efficient operation of those agencies and the industries they regulate. The Collins model could lay the track necessary for shepherding administrative agencies through the Roberts Juristocracy, limiting judicial review and application of the major questions doctrine. There are certainly many unknowns, not least of which is the extent of the major questions doctrine. But Congress still retains significant authority to limit judicial review, and there are opportunities for creative appellate and regulatory lawyering to find the path forward. It is critical to identify and test potential statutory, litigation, and regulatory solutions that can put our important engines of government and industry back on track.

 

*Lewis & Clark Law School L.L.M. Candidate in Environmental, Natural Resources, and Energy Law

Endnotes:

[1] Becky Sullivan, “What to know about the train derailment in East Palestine, Ohio,” NPR.org, Feb. 16, 2023 (available at https://www.npr.org/2023/02/16/1157333630/east-palestine-ohio-train-derailment); Kari Lydersen, “The Case for Nationalizing the Railroads,” InTheseTimes.com, Feb. 16, 2023 (available at https://inthesetimes.com/article/nationalize-the-railroads-workers-on-strike-biden-wages).

[2] West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. ___ (2022).

[3] Collins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. ___ (2021).

[4] Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

[5] See Justice Kagan discussion of stare decisis at n. 29, infra.

[6] Justice Gorsuch drafted a concurring opinion in which he explained the rationale for the major questions doctrine was to “protect the Constitution’s separation of powers.” West Virginia, 597 U.S. at ___ (2022) (J. Gorsuch, dissenting). “The Constitution’s rule vesting federal legislative power in Congress,” he wrote, “is … vital because the framers believed that a republic—a thing of the people—would be more likely to enact just laws than a regime administered by a ruling class of largely unaccountable ‘ministers.’” Id. As journalist Matt Ford pointed out in The New Republic, “Whether Gorsuch appreciated the irony of that statement is unclear.” Matt Ford, “The Supreme Court Conservatives’ Favorite New Weapon for Kneecapping the Administrative State,” NewRepublic.com, Mar. 13, 2023 (available at https://newrepublic.com/article/171093/supreme-court-major-questions-doctrine-administrative-state). Recent reporting on Justice Thomas’s refusal to recuse himself from a case in which his wife was a possible witness and his failure to report extravagant gifts from billionaires—situations which at best might be deemed unchecked ethical lapses and at worst might be called brazen corruption—only serves to drive the point home: Supreme Court justices are the ultimate embodiment of “unaccountable ministers.” Tierney Sneed, “What to know about the Justice Clarence Thomas recusal debate around his wife’s texts,” CNN.com, Mar. 29, 2022 (available at https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/29/politics/clarence-ginni-thomas-election-reversal-texts/index.html); Katherine Hamilton, “Clarence Thomas Sold House To GOP Donor Harlan Crow, Report Says,” Forbes.com, Apr. 13, 2023 (available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/katherinehamilton/2023/04/13/clarence-thomas-sold-house-to-gop-donor-harlan-crow-report-says/?sh=2f3c30f71338).

[7] See generally West Virginia, 597 U.S. at ___ (2022); Collins, 594 U.S. at ___ (2021); Seila Law, LLC v. CFPB, 591 U.S. ___ (2020).

[8] This development is an interesting and concerning volte-face for a conservative legal community that for decades relied on textualism and decried the purported excesses of “activist judges” seeking unrestrained power. To use an analogy familiar to many sports fans, the recent decisions of the Roberts Juristocracy might be called an “ump show.” An ump show refers to a baseball concept, “loosely defined as a moment when an umpire allows himself to exert too much control of the game with heavy-handed decisions.” Joshua Sadlock, “Umpire Jordan Baker Steals Show as Orioles Fall to Red Sox,” BaseballEssential.com, Apr. 18, 2015 (available at https://www.baseballessential.com/news/2015/04/18/umpire-jordan-baker-steals-orioles-fall-red-sox/), last accessed on March 14, 2023. See also Zachary D. Rymer, “In Defense of Umpires: Why Complaints About MLB’s ‘Ump Show’ Problem Miss the Mark,” BleacherReport.com, May 14, 2022 (available at https://bleacherreport.com/articles/10035715-in-defense-of-umpires-why-complaints-about-mlbs-ump-show-problem-miss-the-mark), last accessed March 14, 2023 (an ump show is “when at least one umpire interrupts the flow of a game with a questionable call and/or an attitude that’s just not befitting of the role they’re supposed to be playing. That is, as an independent and unbiased arbiter of the action”).

[9] Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

[10] Id.

[11] West Virginia, 597 U.S. at ___ (2022).

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] David M. Driesen, “Major Questions and Juristocracy,” The Regulatory Review, Jan. 31, 2022 (available at https://www.theregreview.org/2022/01/31/driesen-major-questions-juristocracy/).

[15] West Virginia, 597 U.S. at ___ (2022).

[16] Id.

[17] Roberts also wrote that an extraordinary case is one “in which the history and breadth of the authority that [the agency] has asserted, and the economic and political significance of that assertion, provide a reason to hesitate.” West Virginia, 597 U.S. at ___ (2022). In a nation of 330 million people, on a question that arises from tremendously expensive adversarial litigation, isn’t there always an economically and politically significant “reason to hesitate”?

[18] Seila Law, 591 U.S. at ___ (2020).

[19] Collins, 594 U.S. at ___ (2021).

[20] Seila Law, 591 U.S. at ___ (2020); Collins, 594 U.S. at ___ (2021).

[21] Seila Law, 591 U.S. at ___ (2020); Collins, 594 U.S. at ___ (2021).

[22] Though the Court also distinguished the 1935 decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United StatesSeila Law held that Congress is permitted to include for-cause protection for officers appointed to multi-member bodies like the Federal Trade Commission in 1935. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at ___ (2020); Collins, 594 U.S. at ___ (2021).

[23] Seila Law, 591 U.S. at ___ (2020).

[24] Collins, 594 U.S. at ___ (2021).

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] Id.

[28] Id.

[29]Id. Justice Kagan dissented from the single-director agency rule established by the conservative majority in Seila Law. In Collins, she concurred in the judgment but drafted a dissent highlighting the Court’s failure to follow its own precedent limiting the rule of Seila Law to “single-director agencies ‘wield[ing] significant executive power.’”

In thus departing from Seila Law, the majority strays from its own obligation to respect precedent. To ensure that our decisions reflect “evenhanded” and “consistent development of legal principles,” not just shifts in the Court’s personnel, stare decisis … places demands on the winners. They must apply the Court’s precedents—limits and all—wherever they can, rather than widen them unnecessarily at the first opportunity.

Collins, 594 U.S. at ___ (2021) (J. Kagan, dissenting).

[30] Collins, 594 U.S. at ___ (2021).

[31] Id.

[32] Id.

[33] Id.

[34] Id.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340 (1984); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955); Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948); Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666 (1960); Department of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255 (1999); Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512 (1952).

[38] J.W. Verret, “Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice,” 27 Yale J. on Reg. 283 (2010).

[39] Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States, 99 U.S. 700 (1878).

[40] Verret, n. 38, supra.

Washington State’s Future with Offshore Wind: Opportunities for Capitalizing on Floating Offshore Technology

APRIL 3, 2023   /  MATT GALLAGHER*

 

I. Introduction 

Washington State has long been a leader in renewable energy production and has a reputation for progressive protection of the environment. However, this reputation may be in peril. On one hand, Washington produces an incredible amount of carbon-free electricity attributable to the extensive network of hydroelectric dams within the State’s boundaries. But this carbon-free electricity has not come without cost. Ecological damage associated with Washington’s dams has brought scrutiny since at least the 1940s and is again reaching the national stage.[1],[2] Most notably, the negative impacts to salmon and other native fish populations have sparked calls to breach several of Washington’s dams.[3] So, what is Washington to do?

While it has made efforts to become a leader in hydrogen power and to increase solar capacity, Washington is also among those states positioned to facilitate offshore wind and create another opportunity for clean energy production and diversified grid resilience.[4],[5] Until recently, states on the West Coast faced the reality that the geology of their coastline was not conducive to offshore wind. More specifically, steep continental shelves made fixed-base offshore wind projects impracticable. But the advent of floating offshore wind technologies overcomes that problem, and many experts view floating offshore wind as a key component to meeting the energy demands of the future.[6] Accordingly if Washington is to remain a leader in renewable energy production and respond to the negative impacts of many of the dams in the state, its leadership must look offshore and foster expansion of floating technologies.

 

II. Background and Need for Energy Diversification

Hydroelectric dams within Washington produce more hydroelectric power than in any other state in the country.[7] However, due to the growing call to breach several of these dams, it is time for Washington to diversify its renewable energy infrastructure. Thankfully, this effort is already underway. In 2019, the state committed to increasing its clean energy capacity when it passed the Clean Energy Transformation Act (CETA).[8] Most notably, CETA establishes a series of clean energy benchmarks including: the elimination of coal-fired generation by 2025; becoming greenhouse gas-neutral in its retail electricity supply by 2030; and to achieve 100% carbon-free or renewable power generation by 2045.[9] Importantly, CETA places restrictions on increasing hydroelectric capacity.[10] Consequently, the CETA goals must be achieved by directing resources to other carbon-free energy sectors. Although it is unclear how much generating capacity must be replaced before a responsible breach can occur, it will likely be significant.

In 2021 there were 76 hydroelectric facilities operating in the Evergreen State with a total generating capacity of 21,300 megawatts (MW).[11] These dams are owned by various entities including the federal government, state and local governments, or investor-owned utilities. Their individual generating capacity varies significantly, ranging from 30 megawatts (MW) to over 6800 MW at Grand Coulee Dam–one of the largest hydroelectric dams in the world.[12] Four of the most controversial dams in the state—the Four Lower Snake River Dams—can produce 3500 MW of power during high demand periods, and greatly increase the Northwest power system’s reliability.[13] Because of this capacity, many think a responsible breach of these dams can only occur after this generating capacity has been replaced by other energy resources.[14] Although floating technologies are still in their infancy, their potential for clean, renewable power is immense, and must be considered.

 

III. Floating Offshore Wind Technology and the Biden-Harris Administration

The world’s first floating offshore wind project went online in 2017 off the coast of Scotland.[15] Dubbed the Hywind Project, the Norwegian-designed and built wind farm has an installed-capacity of 30 MW–enough power to supply electricity to about 20,000 homes.[16] While only two additional floating offshore projects have come online since 2017,[17] many countries, including the United States, are seeking to expand their floating offshore energy portfolios. Although there are many potential benefits, this recent focus largely stems from the realization that offshore wind is superior to onshore wind in two important aspects: power and consistency.[18]

A. Summary of Biden Administration Goals

The Biden-Harris Administration has stated two broad and interrelated policy goals relating to offshore wind development in the United States. First, in March of 2021, President Biden announced a goal of deploying 30 gigawatts (GW) of offshore wind capacity, enough to power 10 million homes, by 2030.[19] Offshore windfarms can already be found on the East Coast, where relatively shallow waters made the more traditional fixed-base offshore platforms practicable.[20] However, due to the enormous potential and technological advances made in the offshore industry, on September 15th of this year the Administration announced a second goal of achieving 15 GW of floating offshore wind capacity by 2035. This goal builds on the 30 GW goal announced last year and opens the door to federal support for innovative projects on the West Coast.[21]

B. Federal Work Underway and Opportunities for Washington State

Several federal agencies, including the Departments of Energy, Commerce, and Transportation, are working to accomplish these goals. For example, as part of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Energy EarthshotsTM initiatives, the Floating Offshore Wind ShotTM focuses on reducing the cost of floating offshore technology by 70% by 2035, with an end goal of reducing costs to $45 per MWh.[22] To achieve this goal, DOE is, among other efforts, working to identify barriers to properly scaling these technologies and ensuring the right supply-chain systems are developed, all while ensuring energy justice goals are achieved.[23]

Additionally, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM)—the federal agency with jurisdiction over developing the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)—published a Call for Information and Nominations (Call) in April 2022 to determine the extent of commercial interest in developing floating offshore projects off the Oregon Coast.[24] More recently, the Bureau held an offshore energy lease sale for wind projects off California’s coast, drawing more than $757 million in competitive bids in just a few days.[25] Although federal efforts have not yet focused on Washington, there are early signs of interest. Around the same time BOEM issued its Call regarding Oregon’s project, Trident Winds, LLC, a Seattle based startup sent an unsolicited lease request to the Bureau seeking approval to construct Washington State’s first floating facility.[26] The project, preliminarily named the Olympic Wind Floating Farm, would be located 45 miles west of Westport, WA. If approved, construction for Olympic Wind could start as early as 2028.[27]

Of course, offshore wind development is not without opposition. Among the critics are commercial fishing trade groups fearing degraded fisheries[28] and seaside communities looking to maintain their scenic coastlines.[29] Even environmental groups have raised concerns that BOEM has not properly assessed impacts to marine birds, mammals, and fragile ocean ecosystems before issuing Calls for energy projects.[30] To compound these concerns, offshore wind’s critics often view these negative impacts as extending to the supporting shoreline infrastructure.[31] Consequently, proponents of offshore wind should be prepared to respond. By emphasizing proper planning and early engagement with stakeholders, project proponents will still be positioned to take advantage of supportive state and federal policies and push toward a successful offshore economy.

 

IV. Recommendation to Washington State

While the federal government and industry will have critical roles in meeting the Administration’s goals, there is more that can be done at the state-level. To remain a national leader in renewable energy production, Washington must explore and incentivize a wide-range of renewable energy paths—including offshore wind. Accordingly, Washington should look for opportunities to synergize both the Biden-Harris Administration’s and CETA’s goals. Other states have explored similar paths and may serve as a model for supportive law and policy.

For example, New Jersey passed the Offshore Wind Economic Development Act in 2010, which in part directed its Board of Public Utilities to incentivize offshore wind development.[32] The incentives include tax credits, long-term contract preferences, and other financial support, and were followed by a series of state Executive Orders that established goals for offshore wind capacity.[33] Other states have mandated offshore wind procurement goals and streamlined siting rules for offshore wind-related projects.[34] Washington could benefit from adopting similar approaches in future amendments to the CETA, and in revisions to its Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) that specifically target offshore wind.

More importantly, however, Washington should create industry incentives that take advantage of the already-existing supply chains and infrastructure bordering the Puget Sound to bring offshore wind production in-state. This would shorten the supply chain for offshore development off Washington’s coast and create a gravitational center for offshore wind manufacturing throughout the Pacific Northwest and West Coast.[35] Other West Coast states have identified their lack of appropriate port infrastructure as an impediment to deploying the large-scale turbines needed for floating offshore production.[36] In this respect, Washington’s 11 deep-draft ports, combined with a supply chain that already supports high-tech aviation manufacturing, position it to lead the floating offshore deployment effort.

 

V. Conclusion

While it is unlikely that every hydroelectric dam in Washington will soon be breached, there is a growing call to breach specific dams that negatively impact other natural resources. Therefore, to substitute for this loss in energy supply and to meet its renewable energy goals, it is time for Washington to look to another one of its natural resources: offshore wind. Although behind other West Coast states regarding offshore wind, it is not too late. In fact, there are many compelling reasons why the right time is now. Federal resources to establish an offshore economy are available and there is already commercial interest in making this renewable resource work. But to fully establish the infrastructure and supply chain for this technology, and ultimately have a way to deploy it, specific action is needed at the state level. Washington State should step up and lead the charge.

 

*Lewis & Clark Law School L.L.M. Candidate in Environmental, Natural Resources, and Energy Law

 

[1] DamSense article, “History,” accessed March 31, 2023, https://damsense.org/history.

[2] Geranios, Nicholas K., “White House: to Help Salmon, Dams May Need to Be Removed,” Associated Press, July 12, 2022, accessed March 30, 2023, https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2022-07-12/white-house-to-help-salmon-dams-may-need-to-be-removed. This article highlights two reports released by Federal Agencies in July of 2022. The first report discusses the health of salmon and steelhead populations in the Columbia River Basin. The second lays out opportunities for replacing the generating capacity of the Four Lower Snake River Dams. See Press Release, The White House, United States of America, “Federal Agencies Announce Two New Analyses to Help Inform Restoration of Columbia River Basin Salmon and Long-Term Energy Planning in the Pacific Northwest,” (July 12, 2022), accessed March 31, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ceq/news-updates/2022/07/12/federal-agencies-announce-two-new-analyses-to-help-inform-restoration-of-columbia-river-basin-salmon-and-long-term-energy-planning-in-the-pacific-northwest.

[3] Save Our Wild Salmon, “Why Remove The 4 Lower Snake River Dams?” accessed March 31, 2023, https://www.wildsalmon.org/facts-and-information/why-remove-the-4-lower-snake-river-dams.html.

[4] Baumhardt, Alex, “Oregon, Washington hope to make Northwest the U.S. leader of ‘green hydrogen’ energy,” Oregon Capital Chronicle, September 13, 2022, accessed March 31, 2023, https://oregoncapitalchronicle.com/2022/09/13/oregon-washington-hope-to-make-northwest-the-u-s-leader-of-green-hydrogen-energy.

[5] Bernton, Hal, “Solar farms are booming in Washington state, but where should they go?” the Seattle Times, May 3, 2021, accessed March 31, 2023, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/solar-farms-are-booming-in-washington-state-but-where-should-they-go.

[6] Center for American Progress, “The Road to 30 Gigawatts: Key Actions to Scale an Offshore Wind Industry in the United States,” March 14, 2022, accessed March 31, 2023, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-road-to-30-gigawatts-key-actions-to-scale-an-offshore-wind-industry-in-the-united-states.

[7] U.S. Energy Info. Admin., “Washington State Profile and Energy Estimates,” accessed March 31, 2023, https://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=WA.

[8] Revised Code of Washington, Chapter 19.405, WASHINGTON CLEAN ENERGY TRANSFORMATION ACT, accessed March 31, 2023, https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2019-20/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/Senate/5116-S2.SL.pdf.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] U.S. Energy Info. Admin, “Hydroelectric State,” accessed March 31, 2023, https://www.eia.gov/tools/a-z/index.php?id=C#hydroelectriccapacity. This report compares hydroelectric energy sources by year, state, producer type, and other factors. For this paper, the author sorted the entries by state and year to determine 76 facilities were reported operational in 2021. For a report by the Washington Dep’t of Ecology, see “Inventory of Dams Report,” September 11, 2022, accessed March 31, 2023, https://apps.ecology.wa.gov/publications/documents/94016.pdf.

[12] U.S. Army Corps of Eng’r, “Grand Coulee Dam,” accessed March 31, 2023, https://www.nwd.usace.army.mil/CRSO/Project-Locations/Grand-Coulee/#:~:text=Power%20production%20facilities%20at%20Grand,is%20rated%20at%206%2C809%20megawatts.

[13] Harrison, John, Northwest Power and Conservation Council, “Lower Snake River Dams Replacement Power Study by E3,” July 20, 2022, accessed March 31, 2023, https://www.nwcouncil.org/news/2022/07/20/lower-snake-river-dams-replacement-power-study-by-e3. See also Ross Strategic/Kramer Consulting, “Lower Snake River Dams: Benefit Replacement Report,” August 2022, accessed March 31, 2023, https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/images/LSRD%20Benefit%20Replacement%20Final%20Report_August%202022.pdf. This report was commissioned by the Washington Governor’s Office and Senator Patty Murray’s Office in May 2021 and in part discusses various options for replacing the LSRD generating capacity. However, the report also discusses broader socioeconomic factors relating to the LSRD that are being considered prior to a formal decision on breach.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Equinor, “World’s first floating wind farm has started production,” October 18, 2017, accessed March 31, 2023, https://www.equinor.com/news/archive/worlds-first-floating-wind-farm-started-production.

[16] Equinor, “World’s first floating wind farm has started production,” October 18, 2017, accessed March 31, 2023, https://www.equinor.com/news/archive/worlds-first-floating-wind-farm-started-production.

[17] United Nations, “Floating wind turbines: a new player in cleantech,” April 21, 2022, accessed March 31, 2023, https://unric.org/en/floating-wind-turbines-a-new-player-in-cleantech/. One of the projects, WindFloat Atlantic, is a 25 MW floating windfarm located off the coast of Portugal. The other, the Kincardine Offshore Windfarm, is a six turbine 50 MW project also located off the coast of Scotland that has been called the largest floating wind farm in operation. See Frangoul, Anmar, “Able to power 50,000 homes, the ‘world’s largest floating wind farm’ takes another step forward,” Consumer News and Business Channel (CNBC), September 21, 2021, accessed March 31, 2023, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/21/worlds-largest-floating-wind-farm-takes-another-step-forward.html.

[18] Center for American Progress, “The Road to 30 Gigawatts: Key Actions to Scale an Offshore Wind Industry in the United States,” March 14, 2022, accessed March 31, 2023,https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-road-to-30-gigawatts-key-actions-to-scale-an-offshore-wind-industry-in-the-united-states. This report prov https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-road-to-30-gigawatts-key-actions-to-scale-an-offshore-wind-industry-in-the-united-states/.

[19] The White House, “FACT SHEET: Biden Administration Jumpstarts Offshore Wind Energy Projects to Create Jobs,” March 29, 2021, accessed March 31, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/29/fact-sheet-biden-administration-jumpstarts-offshore-wind-energy-projects-to-create-jobs.

[20] Center for American Progress, “The Road to 30 Gigawatts.”

[21] The White House, “FACT SHEET: Biden-Harris Administration Announces New Actions to Expand U.S. Offshore Wind Energy,” September 15, 2022, accessed March 31, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/09/15/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-announces-new-actions-to-expand-u-s-offshore-wind-energy.

[22] U.S. Dep’t of Energy, “Floating Offshore Wind Shot: Unlocking the Power of Floating Offshore Wind Energy,” September 2022, accessed March 31, 2023, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-09/floating-offshore-wind-shot-fact-sheet.pdf.

[23] Ibid. The Department of Energy’s Office of Economic Impact and Diversity is responsible for the agency’s implementation of the Biden-Harris Administration’s Justice40 Initiative, a plan to direct 40% of the overall climate change investment toward historically burdened communities. For more details on this initiate see The White House, “Justice40: A Whole of Government Initiative,” accessed March 31, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/environmentaljustice/justice40/.

[24] U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., “Renewable Energy: State Activities,” accessed March 31, 2023, https://www.boem.gov/renewable-energy/state-activities.

[25] U.S. Dep’t of Interior, “Biden-Harris Administration Announces Winners of California Offshore Wind Energy Auction,” December 7, 2022, accessed March 31, 2023, https://doi.gov/pressreleases/biden-harris-administration-announces-winners-california-offshore-wind-energy-auction.

[26] Turner, Nicholas, “Seattle developer pushes for WA’s first floating offshore wind farm off Olympic Peninsula,” the Seattle Times, April 11, 2022, accessed March 31, 2023, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/seattle-developer-pushes-for-was-first-floating-offshore-wind-farm-off-olympic-peninsula.

[27] Ibid.

[28] The Responsible Offshore Development Alliance, “Offshore Wind Energy,” accessed March 31, 2023, https://rodafisheries.org/offshore-wind.

[29] Center for American Progress, “The Road to 30 Gigawatts: Key Actions to Scale an Offshore Wind Industry in the United States,” March 14, 2022, accessed March 31, 2023,https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-road-to-30-gigawatts-key-actions-to-scale-an-offshore-wind-industry-in-the-united-states. This report prov https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-road-to-30-gigawatts-key-actions-to-scale-an-offshore-wind-industry-in-the-united-states/.

[30] Center for Biological Diversity & Defenders of Wildlife, “Re: Comments on Request for Interest in Commercial Leasing for Wind Power Development on the Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental Shelf (OCS),” July 26, 2021, accessed March 31, 2023, https://www.regulations.gov/comment/BOEM-2021-0041-0018. Although this comment relates to an offshore project in the Gulf of Mexico, proponents for offshore wind in the Pacific should expect similar commentary.

[31] Peticolas, Susanne & Christopher J. Cavaiola, New Jersey’s Plan to Become the National Capital of Offshore Wind, 35-4 Nat. Res, & Env’t 35, 37 (2021).

[32] 2010 N.J. ALS 57, 2010 N.J. Laws 57, 2010 N.J. Ch. 57, 2010 N.J. S.N. 2036

[33] N.J. Dep’t of Environmental Protection, “About Offshore Wind,” accessed March 31, 2023, https://dep.nj.gov/offshorewind/about.

[34] Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, “Offshore Wind on the Horizon,” December 2017, accessed March 31, 2023, https://www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-natural-resources/offshore-wind-on-the-horizon.aspx.

[35] DOE already recognizes the need for a robust manufacturing supply chain to facilitate offshore development and recently launched a contest to design commercial-scale deployment of the technology. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, “DOE Launches Prize to Accelerate Domestic Supply Chains for Floating Offshore Wind Energy,” September 12, 2022, accessed October 31, 2023, https://www.energy.gov/eere/wind/articles/doe-launches-prize-accelerate-domestic-supply-chains-floating-offshore-wind.

[36] See Oregon Dep’t of Energy, “Floating Offshore Wind: Benefits & Challenges for Oregon,” September 15, 2022, accessed March 31, 2023, https://www.oregon.gov/energy/Data-and-Reports/Documents/2022-Floating-Offshore-Wind-Report.pdf (discussing the lack of appropriate port infrastructure as an impediment to deploying offshore wind).

No Standing in a Monumental Desert: Utah, The Grand Staircase-Escalante and Bears Ears

APRIL 1, 2023   /  NICOLE CROFT*

 

The State of Utah is once again threatening two of America’s largest national monuments.  This is a legal saga Utah has waged over 28 years, through five presidencies.  Despite the economic benefits to the rural communities[1] surrounding them, Utah is on the frontline in the fight against environmental conservation.  This paper will explain why Utah, Kane and Garfield Counties do not have standing in Garfield Co. v. Biden to sue the Administration over the re-established boundaries of Grand Staircase-Escalante and Bears Ears National Monuments because the plaintiffs do not demonstrate concrete injury that would be relieved by judicial redress.

In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court held that standing requires “a concrete and particularized injury, that is traceable to the allegedly unlawful actions of the opposing party, and that is redressable by a favorable judicial decision.”[2] As discussed further in this blog, in its lawsuit challenging the boundaries of the two national monuments, Garfield Co. v. Biden, the plaintiffs fail this standard. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court found that Massachusetts exceeded the Lujan standard in part and had standing to challenge the EPA because it is “a sovereign State…and actually owns a great deal of the territory alleged to be affected.”[3]  Utah and the counties fail this standard as well, as the lands in question are almost exclusively owned by the Federal government and managed by the Bureau of Land Management.

Both national monuments have been considered for special protection going back to 1936,[4] but in 1996, the Clinton Administration established the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, [5] launching a visionary era for the landscape scale management of America’s most precious public lands.[6]  To the east of the state, Bears Ears National Monument was established in the final days of the Obama administration, largely due to the tireless and groundbreaking coalition of the Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition consisting of the nations of Dinè (Navajo), Hopi, Ute, Ute Mountain Ute and the Pueblo of Zuni coming together for the first time to call for protection of their shared ancestral lands and asking to be charged with co-management of this sacred landscape along with the BLM and US Forest Service.[7]

Shortly after the Grand Staircase-Escalante designation, Utah filed suit against the Clinton Administration claiming the designation was an “illegal attempt to prevent a proposed underground coal mine”[8] and was an overreach of the Executive powers bestowed by the Antiquities Act of 1996.[9]  The suit was settled out of court through the exchange of state land parcels included within the Monument’s boundaries, and a federal payout of $50 million dollars, later codified as the Utah Schools and Lands Exchange Act of 1998.[10]  Despite this generous settlement, in 2004, Utah again challenged the Grand Staircase-Escalante in court and lost on the merits; the legality of the monument designation by President Clinton was affirmed.[11]

In 2017, President Trump, with murky rationale, gutted the Utah monuments by retracting over two million acres of protected public lands from Grand Staircase-Escalante and Bears Ears.[12] This action represented the largest rollback of public lands protections in American history,[13] opening the gates to years of litigation and poor management of irreplaceable antiquities and natural resources.[14]

The Biden Administration promptly rescinded these Executive actions in October 2021, restoring the Grand Staircase-Escalante[15] historic boundaries and expanding Bears Ears[16] slightly to more align with the request of the Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition.  Predictably, in August 2022, Utah and Kane and Garfield counties, home to Grand Staircase-Escalante, but not Bears Ears located across the state in San Juan County, filed a complaint, Garfield County et al v. Biden et al, again citing that these designations exceed the powers granted to the Executive by the 1906 Antiquities Act.[17]  Notably, San Juan County has not signed on to this litigation.

The court should dismiss this lawsuit for lack of standing. Utah and the counties’ claims of injury fail to rise to the Lujan requirements for standing as they misrepresent the facts and do not demonstrate how a favorable ruling would resolve their allegations.  The keystone complaint throughout the brief is that the Biden Administration has increased tourism beyond the capacity to manage the monuments.[18] The plaintiffs give President Biden too much credit for this increase.  A key indicator of visitation, Transient Room Tax revenue, demonstrates that Garfield County saw only a 1.7% increase from 2019, when the Trump boundaries were in place to 2021 when the monuments were restored, and in San Juan County, home to Bears Ears, there was a 17.8% decrease in visitor tax revenue in this same period.[19]  These numbers must be considered through the lens of the on-going pandemic, but demonstrate that Utah and the Counties’ assertion of injury based on the Biden restoration of the monuments is purely speculative, not based in fact, and outside the scope of any judicial remedy.

Further, Utah fails to acknowledge that visitation in Southern Utah has been regularly increasing by design.[20]  The State of Utah has been broadly promoting tourism in these regions since 2016 under the “Road to Mighty” campaign.[21]  The Utah Travel Guide highlights tourist destinations in the region of these two monuments no fewer than 15 times.[22]

The plaintiffs also raise multiple claims further demonstrating they do not have legal standing. They allege the designations prevent their ability to conduct restoration and prevent wildfires.[23]  This is a misrepresentation.  The 1999 Grand Staircase Monument Management Plan clearly provided for broad habitat restoration including by mechanical methods such as chaining, and for wildfire suppression.[24] There is no reason to speculate these actions will be excluded from the Management Plans currently being considered, which the Counties and State have opportunity to influence.[25] The plaintiffs also assert that Monuments harm cattle grazing, when in fact, from 1996 to 2017, the number of cattle on the Grand Staircase-Escalante only decreased by .5%,[26] despite crippling drought in the region.[27] There is no evidence to suggest grazing leases would be harmed by Bears Ears, either.  Utah and the counties allege the monuments harm the local economy, despite the Boulder-Escalante Chamber of Commerce’s unanimous position amongst members that the monument should not be reduced.[28]  Further, the County Commissioners of San Juan County demonstrated their support of Bears Ears and withdrew in 2019 as “objecting intervenors” to the litigation challenging the Trump reductions of Bears Ears.[29] Plaintiffs also complain that monuments harm the economic interests of developing school trust lands within the Monuments’ borders.[30] This assertion ignores the Utah Schools and Land Exchange Act (1998) that resolved this issue in the Grand Staircase-Escalante[31] and also overlooks the fact that in May 2022, Utah lawmakers approved swapping 165,000 acres out of the new Bears Ears Boundaries.  This issue was resolved prior to filing of this litigation[32].

In one of its most significant allegations, Utah and the counties claim the monument designations harm Native American interests by not providing explicit protection for indigenous cultural resources. However, no indigenous party has signed on to this complaint.  For the Bears Ears, this claim ignores the tremendous effort and commitment the Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition made to protect their ancestral lands.  In the Bears Ears Proclamation, President Biden calls for the “federally recognized Tribes and State and local governments” to be “provide[d] maximum public involvement in the development” of a management plan for the Monument.[33]    Utah’s claims undermine the “historic consortium of sovereign tribal nations united in the effort to conserve the Bears Ears cultural landscape”[34] and the nationwide indigenous support of the Bears Ears designation.[35]

As for the Grand Staircase-Escalante, Biden’s 2021 proclamation explicitly protects Indigenous cultural resources:

“The Secretary shall, to the maximum extent permitted by law and in consultation with Tribal Nations, ensure the protection of sacred sites and cultural properties and sites in the monument and provide access to Tribal members for traditional cultural, spiritual, and customary uses, consistent with the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (42 U.S.C. 1996) and Executive Order 13007 of May 24, 1996 (Indian Sacred Sites)…”[36]

For all of the reasons above, the plaintiffs’ lawsuit should be dismissed for lack of standing. In 2021, Chief Justice Roberts made it clear the Court was willing to consider the reach permitted to the Executive via the Antiquities Act[37].  Utah, Kane and Garfield Counties have proclaimed they seek to advance this case all the way to the Supreme Court in an effort to significantly curtail the impact of the Act[38].  But as discussed here, plaintiffs have misrepresented the alleged harms these monuments create and fail to demonstrate cognizable injury that could be remedied through a favorable judicial ruling.  Utah, Kane and Garfield Counties should be denied standing.

 

 

[1] Headwaters Economics.  “National Monuments can boost local economies” (2021, May). https://headwaterseconomics.org/public-lands/national-monuments-studies/

[2] Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.  504 U.S. 555 (1992)

[3] Massachusetts v. EPA. 549 U.S. 497 (2007)

[4] Bureau of Land Management, Proposed Escalante National Monument, U.S. Dept. of Interior, (1936) https://www.blm.gov/programs/national-conservation-lands/national-monuments/utah/bears-ears/1936-proposed-map

[5] Exec. Order No. 6920, 61 C.F.R. 50223 (1996).

[6] Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009, 16 U.S.C. §1001 (2009)

[7] Exec. Order No. 9558, 3 C.F.R. 407 (2016)

[8] Utah Ass’n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2001)

[9] The Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. §431-33 (1906).  The Antiquities Act of 1906 bestows the President unilateral authority to set aside “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures and other objects of historic or scientific interest” on federal or government-controlled lands.

[10] 16 U.S.C.§ 431 Utah Schools and Lands Exchange Act of 1998, Pub.I. No. 105-225,112 Stat. 3139 (1998).

[11] Utah Association of Counties v. Bush. 316 F.Supp.2d 1172 (2004)

[12] Exec. Order 9681 82 DR 58081 (2017)

[13] Julie Turkewitz, Trump slashed size of Bears Ears and Grand Staircase Monuments, The New York Times, A 1 (12/04/2017)

[14] Resource Management Plan for the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument and Kanab-Escalante Planning Area, 85 C.F.R. 9802, 9802-9803 (2020).

[15] Exec. Order No. 10286 86 FR 57335

[16] Exec. Order No. 10285 86 FR 57335

[17] Pl’s Compl. Para 3 (2022, Aug 24)

[18] Pl’s Compl. Paras 101, 145-8, 150-1, 161, 180, 195, 197, 199 (22, Aug 24)

[19] Kem C. Gardner Policy Institute.  The State of Utah’s Travel and Tourism Industry (2022) https://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://gardner.utah.edu/wp-content/uploads/Travel-Tourism-Trifold-Jan2022.pdf?x71849

[20] Gorrell, M. (2016, Mar 25).  “Utah unveils $4.6 million ‘Road to Mighty’ Tourism campaign.” Salt Lake Tribune.

[21] Utah Office of Tourism.  Utah Travel Guide. (2022).  https://www.visitutah.com/plan-your-trip/Utah-Travel-Guide

[22] Ibid.

[23] Pl.’s Compl.  Paras 18, 154. 166-8 (2022, Aug 24)

[24] Bureau of Land Management.  Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument Management Plan. (1999)

[25] Exec. Order No. 10285 86 FR 57335, Exec. Order No. 10286 86 FR 57335

[26] Bureau of Land Management. Grand Staircase-Escalante Draft Livestock Grazing Plan Amendment and Update. (2017, Feb 3).

[27] Udall, B., Overpeck, J. The twenty-first century Colorado River hot drought and implications for the future. Water Resources Research. (2017, Mar).

[28] Waggoner, D. Statement for the Record, House Natural Resources Committee, (2019, Mar 13) chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://naturalresources.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Waggoner,%20Dana%20-%20Statement%20for%20the%20Record.pdf

[29] Assoc. Press. “Democrat-controlled San Juan County formally withdraws from Bears Ears court case.  Salt Lake Tribune (2019, Apr 17).

[30] Pl.’s Compl. Paras 200, 203 (2022, Aug 24)

[31] 16 U.S.C. § 431 Utah Schools and Lands Exchange Act of 1998, Pub.I. No. 105-225,112 Stat. 3139 (1998).

[32] Maffly, B. “Utah Lawmakers approve Bears Ears Land Swap.” Salt Lake Tribune. (2022, May 18)

[33] Exec. Order No. 10285 86 FR 57335

[34] Bears Ears Inter-Tribal Coalition.  https://www.bearsearscoalition.org/ (n.d.)

[35] Native America Rights Fund.  “Protecting Bears Ears National Monument.”  https://narf.org/cases/bears-ears/ (n.d.)

[36] Exec. Order No. 10286 86 FR 57335

[37] Mass. Lobstermen’s Ass’n v. Raimondo.  141 S. Ct. 979 (2021

[38] Maffly, B. “Goal of Utah’s Monument Lawsuit: Take down the Antiquities Act” Salt Lake Tribune. (Sep. 5, 2022)

Enforcement under the FTCA for false, misleading, and deceptive corporate statements about carbon offsets

APRIL 1, 2023   /  BRADLEY NEWSAD*

 

Introduction

Corporations across the world, and in particular, the United States, are attempting to sway consumer opinion, perception, and patronage by advertising their status as, or goal to become, carbon neutral.  Additionally, many companies are also offering opportunities for consumers to neutralize the carbon footprint of their own actions.  Most of these claims involve some, if not a significant amount of “carbon offsets.”  The weight of available evidence demonstrates that many claims of carbon offsetting are unfulfilled at best, and an outright scam at worst.  The question is, what, if anything, should be done about these corporate actions?

Corporations should be held accountable for false, misleading, and deceptive statements regarding carbon neutrality and carbon offsetting, chiefly because these claims are hurting the climate change battle – companies are using claims of carbon neutrality and carbon offsetting as an excuse to avoid taking meaningful and sustainable carbon reduction actions.  Importantly, it also creates an unfair advantage over those companies who have taken the moral high ground and refused to engage in the charade.  While there may be several options for regulation – the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) – the best currently available option for enforcement is under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA).  Several examples over the past decade demonstrate the viability of enforcement actions under the principles of the FTC’s “Green Guides.”[i]

Carbon Offsets

The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “carbon offset” as “an action or activity (such as the planting of trees or carbon sequestration) that compensates for the emission of carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases to the atmosphere.”[ii]  This definition accounts for the carbon offset theory of greenhouse gas (GHG) “removal” from the atmosphere.  However, most organizations also include the GHG “reduction” or “avoidance” theory for carbon offsets.[iii]  Reduction and avoidance actions include supporting activities that reduce GHG emissions, such as funding GHG-free power generation projects (e.g., wind and solar power).  Carbon offsets are often quantified and can be “bought, sold, or traded” for various purposes as discussed below.[iv]  Normally, offsets are accounted for on a one-for-one basis (one ton of CO2eq avoided or removed can offset one ton of CO2eq emitted).[v]

Generally, the motivation to buy or trade carbon offsets can be separated into two markets – the legally-required market and the voluntary market.  Examples of the legally-required market include the actions taken in conformity with the Kyoto Protocol’s “Clean Development Mechanism” (CDM).[vi]  Under the Kyoto Protocol, developed country parties to the treaty were required to reduce their GHG emissions by a certain percentage as compared to their 1990 emissions.[vii]  However, for developed countries that were either unable or unwilling to reduce their actual GHG emissions to fully meet the required reduction, under the CDM they could fund projects in developing countries to earn “certified emissions reductions” (CERs).  The CERs would offset a developed country’s actual GHG emissions, as long as the project was certified by an oversight committee to result in “[r]eal, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change” and the CERs were “additional to any that would occur in the absence of” the project.[viii]  These requirements form the foundation for legitimate carbon offsets – real, independently verifiable, long-term or permanent, and additive.[ix]

In contrast to legally mandated actions to reduce GHG emissions, there is also an entire market based on voluntary action to offset GHG emissions of an individual or an entire corporation or organized entity.  Basically, these are offsets bought by companies for public relations and marketing reasons or by consumers to make them feel better about their carbon footprint.  As early as 2006, the global market for sales of voluntary carbon offsets was over a $100 million.[x]  Since that time, the market has fluctuated between $146 and $790 million per year, with a cumulative total of $6.7 billion in global sales of voluntary carbon offsets as of November 2021.[xi]  The most concerning voluntary carbon offsets include those (1) purchased by large corporations (to offset their own GHG emissions), (2) sold by large corporations to consumers of their goods and services to offset the consumers’ apportioned GHG emissions from the goods and services purchased from the corporation,[xii] and (3) sold by corporations to individuals and businesses to offset their own emissions unrelated to the selling corporation.

The first type includes corporations and other organizations voluntarily “seeking to green up their act.”[xiii]  These could be spurred by a number of motivations, including “a sense of corporate social responsibility, a perceived market advantage in claiming voluntary carbon neutrality, or the potential advantage of pre-compliance” before the enactment of legal requirements.[xiv]  A specific example is Nestle S.A.’s pledge to make its KitKat candy production carbon neutral by 2025.[xv]  Nestle’s plan includes “restoring forests and supporting a transition to regenerative agriculture “ and investing “in high quality offsetting based on natural climate solutions.”[xvi]  An example of the second type – where a corporation shifts the burden to their customers to offset the corporation’s GHG emissions – is where Southwest Airlines, for an extra fee (based on aircraft type, fuel consumption, and flight distance), offers to invest your money in a project to offset the GHG emissions attributable to you from your flight (projects include a wind farm in Uruguay and forest protection in Haiti and Tlingit).[xvii]  This example can be replicated for almost any business (assuming they can calculate, and apportion, the GHG emissions from their goods and services with reasonable accuracy).  An example of the third type is where corporations, such as Native and Terrapass, sell carbon offsets to individuals and businesses to offset their own GHG emissions.  Individuals or businesses provide information about their actions and carbon use and the corporations use algorithms to calculate the particular carbon footprint (in CO2eq).  The business or individual then pays the corporation to invest in projects that, in theory, are intended to offset their GHG emissions on a one-to-one basis.  Projects offered by Native and Terrapass include a wind farm in Crow Lake, South Dakota (Terrapass), a landfill gas capture project in Henrico County, Virginia (Terrapass), solar power projects in Cortez, Colorado and Forest City, Iowa (Native), and an “avoided grassland conversion” project in Prowers County, Colorado (Native).[xviii]

 

The Problem(s) with Carbon Offsets

Carbon offsets are not necessarily all a scam; despite a lack of widespread empirical data, one can safely assume that most carbon offset projects are real and verifiable.  The question is whether a particular project, or a credit purchased in that project, regardless if it is legally mandated or voluntary, is effective – will it result in additional and long-term or permanent GHG emission removal, reduction, or avoidance without leakage?[xix]  Despite an entire industry of standard-setting and auditing organizations to provide review of carbon offset projects, the scientific evidence and investigative reporting generally indicate that most offset projects do not achieve their stated goals.[xx]

A good example of a project that provided real, verifiable, long-term, and additional GHG emission avoidance, but failed to provide the stated corporate carbon offset goal, is the 56MW wind farm in Tuppadahalli, India.[xxi]  The wind farm was built from 2010 to 2012 during the Kyoto Protocol enforcement period and was registered with the CDM.[xxii]  As part of the CDM, Acciona, the farm’s owner, sold CERs to subsidize its business.[xxiii]  In early 2021, Delta Airlines announced it was going to be fully carbon neutral by spending money on sustainability efforts, including carbon offset projects.[xxiv]  At the same time, Delta announced that it had spent $30 million on carbon credits, some of which came from the Acciona wind farm in Tuppadahalli.[xxv]  However, the problem is that the wind farm construction was completed nine years earlier and it had been profitably operating for nearly a decade.  The money spent by Delta to purchase the carbon credits presumably went to Acciona as business profits, not as a subsidy for an otherwise unprofitable venture that was under threat of failure or closure.[xxvi]  At a minimum, Delta’s purchase of these CERs fails to provide any “additional” emissions reduction or avoidance than what would have occurred without their purchase because the money used to purchase the CERs did not increase the wind farm’s power capacity, electricity distribution, or life-span.

For a few examples of carbon offset projects that are laughably ineffective, and in some cases knowingly so by all involved, watch John Oliver’s 23-minute segment from August 2022 from “Last Week Tonight with John Oliver.”[xxvii]  Oliver highlights several offset projects including a private hunting club in New Jersey selling offsets to stop logging which it has no intention of ever allowing anyway, JP Morgan Chase purchasing offsets to prevent logging of an already protected nature preserve, and private landowners selling credits to defer logging for as little as one year.  Accepting that some (if not most) carbon offset projects are not effective, the concern is that corporations are aware of this, yet make public statements to the contrary.  And if it can be shown that a corporation knew, or should have known, that the project would, could, or did not achieve the offsetting goal, how can it be held accountable?

 

Options to regulate and impose civil penalties – SEC, CFTC, FTC

Corporations should be held accountable for false, misleading, and deceptive statements regarding carbon neutrality and carbon offsetting.  Not only do these claims hurt the climate change battle – pursuit of carbon neutrality through ineffective carbon offsetting allows corporations to avoid taking meaningful and sustainable GHG emission reduction actions – they also create an unfair advantage over those companies who have taken the moral high ground and refused to engage in the charade.  There are several federal agencies that could regulate these statements, including the SEC, the CFTC, and the FTC.

The SEC submitted its proposed regulation to “enhance and standardize climate related disclosures for investors” for notice and comment in March 2022.[xxviii]  The SEC has yet to announce the final regulations.  However, it’s unclear that these new regulations will provide the basis to impose civil penalties on a corporation for false, misleading, and deceptive statements regarding carbon neutrality and carbon offsetting projects.  More importantly, it is likely that once the final SEC regulations are announced, they will be challenged in federal court.[xxix]  Given the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent holding in West Virginia v. EPA, it’s likely any challenge will raise the “major question doctrine” challenging whether Congress delegated to the SEC the authority to regulate corporate actions related to climate change.[xxx]

The CFTC has expressed recent interest in regulating the voluntary carbon market.  In June 2022, the CFTC convened a discussion panel and invited market participants and experts to discuss issues surrounding carbon offsets, most importantly standardization.[xxxi]  Even more recently, seven Democratic party U.S. Senators wrote a letter to CFTC Chairman Rostin Behnam urging the CFTC to “pursue strong oversight” over the voluntary carbon offset market.[xxxii]  The Senators argued that the “CFTC should take concrete steps to implement rules . . . [that] include a clear definition of a carbon credit and a robust standard for auditing” and recommended that the CFTC pursue cases of fraud.[xxxiii]  CFTC has authority to regulate the carbon market as it has jurisdiction over “derivatives products such as futures contracts based on offsets.”[xxxiv]

While the CFTC may present an opportunity to regulate some carbon offset claims, its jurisdiction is narrow and some (if not a significant portion) of offset projects may not qualify as derivatives products or futures contracts.  More importantly, any meaningful action is too far away – on average it takes 4 to 8 years from regulation development to enforcement.[xxxv]  And the Senators’ letter acknowledges that the CFTC is still in the early stages of regulation development – their first recommendation is that the agency investigate the current situation.[xxxvi]

The urgent need to reduce global GHG emissions and the United States’ commitment under the Paris Agreement, counsels that the federal government should pursue all presently available actions before engaging in the long process of promulgating new regulations.  The best currently available option for enforcement action is under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA).  Specifically, the FTCA makes it unlawful to use “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”[xxxvii]  The FTC’s Green Guides, which the FTC declares are administrative interpretations of the FTCA that do not carry the force of law, contain a specific section on “Carbon Offsets.”[xxxviii]  That section, published in 2012 revisions to the Green Guides, gives notice to corporations that statements related to carbon offsets can be false, misleading, or deceptive.[xxxix]  As such, the Guides advise corporations to “employ competent and reliable scientific and accounting methods to properly quantify claimed emission reductions.”[xl]

Over the last seven years alone, the FTC and the Department of Justice have successfully pursued 20 cases to enforce the statutory basis for the Green Guides, demonstrating the viability of their enforcement.[xli]  Just this year, Kohl’s and Walmart settled complaints, for $2.5 and $3 million in civil penalties, respectively, for making deceptive and misleading environmental claims in their products.[xlii]

Ultimately, while the best enforcement action for false, misleading, or deceptive statements by corporations about carbon offsets may be through the SEC or the CFTC, those options are at least four years down the road.  In order to make a positive effect today, the federal government should use the FTCA and the Green Guides to stop the carbon offset charade and impose penalties on those corporations making false, misleading, or deceptive statem

 

 

[i] 16 C.F.R. part 260 (2022).

[ii] “Carbon offset.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/carbon%20offset (last visited Mar. 25, 2023).

[iii] Derik Broekhoff and Kathryn Zyla, Outside the Cap: Opportunities and Limitations of Greenhouse Gas Offsets, World Resources Institute Climate and Energy Policy Series 2 (2008) available at https://files.wri.org/d8/s3fs-public/outside_the_cap.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2023).

[iv] See “Carbon offset” supra note 2 (carbon offset also defined as “a quantifiable amount of such an activity that may be bought, sold, or traded especially as part of a system to reduce pollutants in the atmosphere.”).

[v] “CO2eq” is shorthand for carbon dioxide equivalent emissions.  For GHGs other than CO2, the CO2eq is calculated by multiplying the amount of emissions for the particular GHG by its global warming potential (GWP).  GWP, which is determined based on scientific data and studies, represents a GHG’s global warming potential in reference to CO2.  Accordingly, the GWP for CO2 is 1.0.  GHGs that contribute more to global warming on a ton-by-ton basis, will have a GWP greater than 1.0.  See Chris Wold, International Environmental Law 284-85 (2022) (self-published).

[vi] Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 12, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148.

[vii] Id. at Art. 3, Annex A, Annex B.

[viii] Id. at Art. 12.

[ix] See Broekhoff & Zyla supra note 3.  “Enforceable” is also included as a key feature.  The “additionality” of a project ensures that any GHG emission reduction, avoidance, or removal is additional to any that would have happened without the intervention of the project.  See Broekhoff & Zyla supra note 3 at 2-3.  A classic example of a project failing to provide additionality is where a project “protects” a forest from being cut down even though there was no actual plan or threat for the forest to be cut down.

[x] Maria Savasta-Kennedy, The Newest Hybrid: Notes Toward Standardized Certification of Carbon Offsets, 34 N.C.J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 851, 852 (2009).

[xi] Stephen Donofrio et al., Ecosystem Marketplace Insight Report, Markets in Motion: State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2021 Installment 1 3 (Sept. 15, 2021) available at https://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/publications/state-of-the-voluntary-carbon-markets-2021/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2023).

[xii] Savasta-Kennedy supra note 10 at 851-853.

[xiii] Id. at 853.

[xiv] Id.

[xv] Press Release, Nestle S.A. (Apr. 21, 2021) available at https://www.nestle.com/media/news/kitkat-carbon-neutral-2025-sustainability-efforts#:~:text=KitKat%2C%20one%20of%20the%20world’s,as%20part%20of%20the%20plan (last visited Mar. 25, 2023).

[xvi] Id.

[xvii] Southwest Airlines Co., Carbon Offset Program available at https://www.southwest.com/carbon-offset-program/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2023).

[xviii] Terrapass projects available at https://terrapass.com/projects/sustainable-living-projects (last visited Mar. 25, 2023); Native projects available at https://native.eco/your-projects/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2023).

[xix] “Leakage” occurs when the GHG emissions that are reduced or avoided by one project are simply transferred to another emission source.  See Broekhoff & Zyla supra note 3 at 2.  A basic example would be a forest protection project where the forest was originally slated or threatened to be cut down, but the project invested money to prevent that action on a long-term or permanent basis.  Leakage would occur if the entity that was going to cut down the now protected forest, instead cut down trees from a different forest.  In the end, little to no GHG emissions have been avoided or reduced (in fact, they could be even larger than they would have been without the project).

[xx] Alex Fredman and Todd Phillips, The CFTC should raise standards and mitigate fraud in the carbon offset market (Oct. 7, 2022) available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-cftc-should-raise-standards-and-mitigate-fraud-in-the-carbon-offsets-market/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2023).

[xxi] Acciona inaugurates 56MW wind farm in India, Wind Energy and Electric Vehicle Magazine (May 31, 2012) available at https://www.evwind.es/2012/05/31/acciona-inaugurates-56-mw-wind-farm-in-india/18833 (last visited Mar. 25, 2023) (no author listed); Shane Shifflett, Are Carbon Credits Still Working?, The Wall Street Journal (Sep. 1, 2022) available at https://www.wsj.com/podcasts/the-journal/are-carbon-credits-still-working/e0e05149-ad60-4fdc-923a-679747afb63c (last visited Mar. 25, 2023).

[xxii] Id. (Shifflett article).

[xxiii] Id.

[xxiv] Id.

[xxv] Id.

[xxvi] Id.

[xxvii] Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO broadcast Aug. 22, 2022) available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=6p8zAbFKpW0 (last visited Mar. 25, 2023).

[xxviii] Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Proposes Rules to Enhance and Standardize Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors (Mar. 21, 2022) available at https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2022-46 (last visited Mar. 25, 2023); The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors, 87 Fed. Reg. 21,334 (proposed Apr. 11, 2022) (to be codified 17 C.F.R. part 200).

[xxix] Jacqueline Vallette and Kathryne Gray, SEC’s Climate Risk Disclosure Proposal Likely to Face Legal Challenges, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (May 10, 2022) available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/05/10/secs-climate-risk-disclosure-proposal-likely-to-face-legal-challenges/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2023).

[xxx] See id. (stating that litigants may argue the SEC’s proposed regulation exceeds the limits on regulating major policy questions); West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022) (holding that the EPA’s assertion of authority to substantially restructure the American energy market was subject to the major question doctrine and that Congress did not provide clear authority for the challenged regulation under the ancillary and gap-filler provision of the Clean Air Act used for authority by the EPA).

[xxxi] See Press Release No. 8525-22, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC Announces Voluntary Carbon Markets Convening (May 11, 2022) available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8525-22 (last visited Mar. 25, 2023); Press Release No. 8539-22, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC Announces Agenda for the June 2nd Voluntary Carbon Markets Convening (Jun. 1, 2022) available at https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8539-22 (last visited Mar. 25, 2023); Fredman & Phillips supra note 20.

[xxxii] Letter from Senator Corey Booker et al. to Chairman Rostin Behnam (Oct. 13, 2022), available at https://www.booker.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/letter_to_cftc_re_carbon_offsets_oct_2022.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2023).

[xxxiii] Id. at 2-3.

[xxxiv] Fredman & Phillips supra note 20.

[xxxv] See William Funk et al., Administrative Procedure and Practice: A Contemporary Approach 139-140 (rev. 6th ed. 2018) citing Testimony of Sidney A. Shapiro Before the Judiciary Committee. United States House of Representatives. Hearing on H.R. 3010, Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011 (Oct. 25, 2011) (Professor Shapiro outlined the various steps and the time attributed to each for a major/significant rule; this included 1-3 years for judicial review upon challenge in federal court).

[xxxvi] Senator Booker et al. Letter supra note 32 at 2.

[xxxvii] 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2022).

[xxxviii] See Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, FTC Issues Revised “Green Guides” (Oct. 1, 2012) (the Green Guides “take into account nearly 340 unique comments and more than 5,000 total comments received since the FTC released the proposed revised Guides in the fall of 2010”) available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2012/10/ftc-issues-revised-green-guides (last visited Mar. 25, 2023); Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, FTC The Green Guides: Statement of Basis and Purpose 9 (Oct. 1, 2012) (the Green Guides are “administrative interpretations of Section 5” of the FTCA) available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-issues-revised-green-guides/greenguidesstatement.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2023); 16 C.F.R. § 260.5 (2022).

[xxxix] 16 C.F.R. § 260.5(a) (2022); see also Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,122 (Oct. 11, 2012) (supplementary information to the published regulations “advises marketers to have competent and reliable scientific evidence to support their carbon offset claims, including using appropriate accounting methods to ensure they are properly quantifying emission reductions”).

[xl] 16 C.F.R. § 260.5(a) (2022).

[xli] See Green Guides: Cases, Federal Trade Commission available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/topics/truth-advertising/green-guides (last visited Mar. 25, 2023).

[xlii] Id.

EPA’s Designation of PFOA and PFOS as Hazardous Substances: Far Reaching Implications but not Enough to Combat “Forever Chemicals.”

APRIL 1, 2023   /  RYAN E. LEWIS*

I. Introduction

The Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) proposed regulation (Rule)[1] classifying perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid (PFOS) as hazardous chemicals is a step in the right direction and will have significant implications for a wide range of industries. However, these “forever chemicals” are now found in people, wildlife, rain and even the arctic air and snow.[2] EPA waited too long to regulate Perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) and the Rule cannot combat the environmental impact of these chemicals. The Rule is also too narrow in scope. In order to reduce human and environmental exposure to PFAS, EPA should regulate class.

 

II. Brief History of PFAS

PFAS are a group of over 9,000 synthetic chemicals.[3] They were invented in the 1930s and processed commercially in the 1940s.[4] These chemicals have multiple uses which have contributed to their popularity over the years. PFAS have been used to make nonstick cookware, water-repellent clothing and gear, stain resistant fabrics and carpets, food packaging, microwave-popcorn bags, stain-resistant carpets, pipes and wires that resist corrosion, some cosmetics, some firefighting foams, and generally, products that resist grease, water, and oil.[5]

PFAS are often called “forever chemicals” because they are extremely persistent.[6] PFAS contain carbon-fluorine bonds which are some of the strongest chemical bonds in organic chemistry.[7] The strong carbon-fluorine bond means PFAS resist degradation in the human body and the environment.[8] PFAS build up in our bodies and do not break down in the environment resulting in long-term PFAS exposure to humans and the environment.[9] Nearly all Americans, including newborn babies, have PFAS in their blood.[10]

The most studied PFAS, and the specific chemicals EPA intends to regulate as hazardous chemicals, are perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid (PFOS). Most uses of PFOA and PFOS were phased out in the United States in the mid-2000s.[11] However, some are still produced domestically for certain purposes and these chemicals remain in the environment due to their long-term resistance to degradation.[12] Also problematic is the fact that some newer PFAS break down into PFOA and PFOS.[13] Thus, even though these chemicals are not widely manufactured, they are still produced in the environment when newer, replacement PFAS degrade into PFOA and PFOS.

Peer-reviewed scientific studies have shown that exposure to PFAS may cause cancer, reproductive and immune system harm, and other diseases. Specifically, EPA has found compelling evidence that PFOA and PFOS exposure can cause an increased risk of cancer, decreased fertility, developmental delays in children, and risk of obesity, as well as other affects from exposure.[14]

 

III. The Proposed Rule

In October 2021, EPA announced a “Strategic Roadmap to confront PFAS contamination nationwide.”[15] The Roadmap provided for: increasing investments in research; restricting PFAS chemicals from being released into the environment; and accelerating the cleanup of PFAS contamination.[16] On September 6, 2022, EPA published its Rule to designate PFOA and PFOS, including their salts and structural isomers,[17] as hazardous substances under CERCLA in the Federal Register.[18]  The comment period closed on November 7, 2022.[19]

In its Rule, EPA maintains the “adverse human health effects, mobility, persistence, prevalence and other factors related to PFAS” support EPA’s finding that PFOA and PFOS “when released into the environment may present substantial danger to the public health or welfare” such that it warrants a “designation as a CERCLA hazardous substance.”[20] The Rule has three provisions to regulate PFOA and PFOS.[21] First, the Rule will trigger a reporting obligation. Under CERCLA Section 102(b), the reportable quantity for any hazardous substance is one pound.[22] The Rule does not include a reportable quantity (RQ) adjustment for PFOA and PFOS and EPA is using the statutory default of one pound.[23] Under the reporting obligation, any person in charge of a vessel or facility must immediately notify the National Response Center if there is a release of one pound of PFOA or PFOS within a 24-hour period.[24] There are also additional reporting requirements under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA). Property owners of  PFOA or PFOS Superfund sites will be required to clean up those sites.[25] The second prong of the Rule requires that upon any transfer or sale of property by a Federal agency, the agency must provide notice of hazardous substances, including PFOA and PFOS, that were stored on the property, information regarding any releases of the hazardous substances and provide covenants of remediation.[26] The final requirement of the Rule requires that PFOA and PFOS must be listed and regulated as hazardous materials by the Department of Transportation (DOT) under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA).[27]

There are numerous entities which may be affected by this Rule. The Rule highlights five broad categories of industries that may be affected and a list of North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) codes.[28] The categories listed include: PFOA and/or POAS manufacturers; PFOA and/or PFOS processors; manufacturers of products containing PFOA and/or PFOS; downstream product manufacturers and users of PFOA and/or PFOS products; and waste management and wastewater treatment facilities.[29] The type and number of industries affected by the Rule are wide-ranging and significant.

 

IV. The Positive Impact of Hazardous Substance Designation

The Rule will have immediate positive impacts. Designating PFOA and PFOS as hazardous substances under CERCLA gives EPA authority to order the cleanup of contaminated sites, many of which are in under-served areas already burdened with pollution. If the government initiates the clean-up of PFOA and PFOS, it may recover costs. Moreover, designating PFOA and PFOS as hazardous substances under CERCLA will improve transparency and accountability.[30] The reporting requirement of the Rule will also provide EPA with data that could trigger cleanups and protect public health.[31] The ability to recover cleanup costs will likely encourage better waste management and will require that costs be covered by the responsible party rather than the community.[32]

Another positive outcome of the Rule is that all states will now have PFOA and PFOS regulation. Currently, some states have enacted phase-outs of PFAS in food packaging, and restrictions on PFAS in carpeting, children’s toys, cosmetics, and fire-fighting foam.[33] However, other states have not enacted any protections against PFAS.[34] The new Rule will reduce exposure to PFAS for all citizens and address contamination sites in all states.

 

V. Why the Rule is Insufficient to Combat these Forever Chemicals

The implications of EPA’s designation of PFOS and PFOA as Hazardous Substances will be far reaching. However the Rule’s ability to combat the environmental impact of these types of “forever chemicals” is not commensurate with their severity because the Rule is limited to PFOS and PFOA. For example, although the reporting requirement is important, it is limited to the release of one pound of PFOA or PFOS within a 24-hour period. Since many companies have stopped manufacturing PFOA or PFOS, this Rule is not enough. A reporting requirement for the accidental release of one pound of all PFAS is necessary.

Similarly, cleanup of contamination on a site-specific basis for PFOA and PFOS is an improvement, but it will not assist in reducing the exposure that stems from the ground contaminants of other PFAS chemicals. The Rule will not remedy the human and environmental exposure to PFAS unless EPA extends the Rule to cover all PFAS. In the Rule, EPA hints that it will likely expand the Regulation and designate other PFAS as hazardous chemicals.[35] EPA should go a step farther and declare the entire class of PFAS as hazardous substances.

The Regulation acknowledges that recent human epidemiological studies indicate that negative health effects occur at much lower exposure levels than previously understood.[36] Waiting for studies to confirm what has been suspected for decades will only perpetuate the effects of these chemicals on humans and the environment. In order to combat these “forever chemicals,” EPA must lead by reducing the initial exposure to all PFAS, not attempt to solve the problem after significant exposure. To properly combat PFAS, EPA must take a proactive, rather than reactive, approach in its Rule.

To understand why PFAS must be regulated as a class, it is important to understand the underlying chemistry of PFAS. In 2006, EPA launched a program called the “2010/2015 Stewardship Program” and eight major chemical companies agreed to phase out PFOA and PFOS.[37] This program worked to reduce the “long chain” chemicals. PFOA and PFOS are known as “long chain chemicals” because they contain eight carbon atoms.[38] Since these chemicals have been phased out, scores of “short chain” replacements, PFAS with six carbon atoms, have replaced PFOA and PFOS.[39]  The short chain replacements are not part of the phase-out program. Chemical companies claim this structure makes them safer but there is evidence that these “short chain” PFAS cause cancerous tumors in lab animals.[40] One study found that short-chain PFAS may pose an even greater risk to humans and the environment than long-chains.[41] These studies suggest that the entire class of PFAS are hazardous and should all be regulated as hazardous substances.

PFOA and PFOS have been produced and released into the environment since the 1940s. These chemicals do not degrade, so it will be difficult, if not impossible, to reduce exposure to “forever chemicals” if the Rule does not include the “replacement” PFAS. While the Rule will remove one source of exposure, it ignores thousands of other PFAS that scientists believe have the same, if not greater, impact on humans and the environment. “When chemicals have similar molecular structures, environmental properties, and/or biological hazards, managing them as a class can be an effective means of reducing adverse effects on human and ecological health.”[42] Since it is not possible to thoroughly assess every single PFAS, EPA must regulate these chemicals as a class so that they do not continue to accumulate and cause harm.[43]

The language of the Rule itself supports a finding that PFAS should be regulated as a class. The Rule maintains that the “adverse human health effects, mobility, persistence, prevalence and other factors related to PFAS” supports EPA’s finding that PFOA and PFOS “when released into the environment may present substantial danger to the public health or welfare” such that it warrants a “designation as a CERCLA hazardous substance.”[44] Moreover, regulating the chemicals as a class will provide more certainty and direction for relevant industries. Otherwise, these industries are likely to face expanding regulations in the future.

 

VI. Conclusion

EPA’s proposed Regulation to classify PFOA and PFOS as hazardous chemicals is the most significant and far-reaching aspect of the EPA’s attempt to address PFAS contamination. However, the biological accumulation and environmental persistence of PFAS along with new evidence that these chemicals are more harmful than originally believed, warrant an unprecedented response. EPA should regulate all PFAS as a single class.[45] While regulating PFAS as an entire class may be inconvenient and expensive, it is the only way to ensure a reduction in PFAS exposure.

 

*Ryan E. Lewis is an LL.M. Candidate in Environmental, Natural Resources, and Energy Law at Lewis & Clark Law School. She has more than ten (10+) years of complex litigation experience with a focus on complex multiparty litigation in state and federal courts. Ryan received her B.A. from Emory University and her J.D. from SUNY Buffalo.

 

[1]The author anticipates the proposed regulation will face significant litigation regarding its legality. Due to substantial costs involved in complying with the regulation and questions regarding whether the EPA has “clear congressional authorization” to regulate PFOA and PFOS in this manner, it is possible that this regulation will invoke the “Major Questions Doctrine” recently set forth in West Virginia v. EPA. 597 U.S. ___ (2022). Since this paper addresses the effectiveness of the regulation, not its legality, the author does not discuss the Major Questions Doctrine due to the narrow and limited scope of this paper; See generally, Designation of Perfluorooctanoic Acid (PFOA) and Perfluorooctanesulfonic Acid (PFOS) as CERCLA Hazardous Substances, 87 Fed. Reg. 54415, 5417 (proposed Sept. 6, 2022) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 302).

[2]Designation of Perfluorooctanoic Acid (PFOA) and Perfluorooctanesulfonic Acid (PFOS) as CERCLA Hazardous Substances, 87 Fed. Reg. 54415, 5417 (proposed Sept. 6, 2022) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 302).

[3] Annie Sneed, “Forever Chemicals Are Widespread in U.S. Drinking Water,” Scientific American, January 22, 2021, available at https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/forever-chemicals-are-widespread-in-u-s-drinking-water/

[4]“What Are PFAS?” Rachel Ross published April 30, 2019, available at https://www.livescience.com/65364-pfas.html (PFAS were invented in the 1930s); See also, Designation of Perfluorooctanoic Acid (PFOA) and Perfluorooctanesulfonic Acid (PFOS) as CERCLA Hazardous Substances, 87 Fed. Reg. 54418 (proposed Sept. 6, 2022) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 302) (“PFAS have been used in industry and consumer products since the 1940s”).

[5]Designation of Perfluorooctanoic Acid (PFOA) and Perfluorooctanesulfonic Acid (PFOS) as CERCLA Hazardous Substances, 87 Fed. Reg. 54415, 54442 (proposed Sept. 6, 2022) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 302) (discussing multiple manufactured goods that use PFAS).

[6]The Clean Water Fund “PFAS: The Forever Chemicals,” available at

https://www.cleanwateraction.org/sites/default/files/MA_FactSheet_PFAS_04.14.20a.pdf

[7] See, Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances Technical and Regulatory Guidance, The Interstate Technology & Regulatory Council PFAS Team June 2022

[8] Id.

[9]Designation of Perfluorooctanoic Acid (PFOA) and Perfluorooctanesulfonic Acid (PFOS) as CERCLA Hazardous Substances, 87 Fed. Reg. 54417 (proposed Sept. 6, 2022) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 302) (stating that PFOA and PFOS are widely detected in surface water samples collected from lakes and rivers, in soil samples, in groundwater including private drinking wells and public drinking water systems, and in wild and domestic animals such as fish, shellfish, alligators, deer, and avian eggs).

[10]The Clean Water Fund “PFAS: The Forever Chemicals,” available at

https://www.cleanwateraction.org/sites/default/files/MA_FactSheet_PFAS_04.14.20a.pdf

[11]U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Questions and Answers: Drinking Water Health Advisories for PFOA, PFOS, GenX Chemicals and PFBS,” Last updated on JULY 18, 2022 available at https://www.epa.gov/sdwa/questions-and-answers-drinking-water-health-advisories-pfoa-pfos-genx-chemicals-and-pfbs; See also, Designation of Perfluorooctanoic Acid (PFOA) and Perfluorooctanesulfonic Acid (PFOS) as CERCLA Hazardous Substances, 87 Fed. Reg. 54415, 54417 (proposed Sept. 6, 2022) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 302).

[12]Id.

[13]U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Questions and Answers: Drinking Water Health Advisories for PFOA, PFOS, GenX Chemicals and PFBS,” Last updated on JULY 18, 2022 available at https://www.epa.gov/sdwa/questions-and-answers-drinking-water-health-advisories-pfoa-pfos-genx-chemicals-and-pfb; Designation of Perfluorooctanoic Acid (PFOA) and Perfluorooctanesulfonic Acid (PFOS) as CERCLA Hazardous Substances, 87 Fed. Reg. 54415, 54417 (proposed Sept. 6, 2022) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 302).

[14]U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Our Current Understanding of the Human Health and Environmental Risks of PFAS.” Last updated March 2022, available at https://www.epa.gov/pfas/our-current-understanding-human-health-and-environmental-risks-pfas (The EPA has found compelling evidence that PFOA and PFOS exposure can cause: reproductive effects such as decreased fertility or increased high blood pressure in pregnant women; developmental effects or delays in children, including low birth weight, accelerated puberty, bone variations, or behavioral changes; increased risk of some cancers, including prostate, kidney, and testicular cancers; reduced ability of the body’s immune system to fight infections, including reduced vaccine response; interference with the body’s natural hormones; increased cholesterol levels and/or risk of obesity).

[15]U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “EPA Administrator Regan Announces Comprehensive National Strategy to Confront PFAS Pollution.” October 18, 2021, available at https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-administrator-regan-announces-comprehensive-national-strategy-confront-pfas

[16]Id.

[17]Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances Technical and Regulatory Guidance, The Interstate Technology & Regulatory Council PFAS Team June 2022 (explaining that an isomer is a molecule with the same molecular formula as another molecule, but with a different chemical structure).

[18]Designation of Perfluorooctanoic Acid (PFOA) and Perfluorooctanesulfonic Acid (PFOS) as CERCLA Hazardous Substances, 87 Fed. Reg. 54415, 54429 (proposed Sept. 6, 2022) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 302).

[19]Id. at 4415 (detailing that the EPA received 62,559 comments on the Rule).

[20]Id. at 54417.

[21]Id. at 54429.

[22]Id.

[23]The Rule indicates that the agency may adjust the RQ in the future. See, Designation of Perfluorooctanoic Acid (PFOA) and Perfluorooctanesulfonic Acid (PFOS) as CERCLA Hazardous Substances, 87 Fed. Reg. 54415, 54429 (proposed Sept. 6, 2022) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 302).

[24]Id. at 54429 (“Section 103 of CERCLA requires any person in charge of a vessel or facility to immediately notify the NRC when there is a release of a hazardous substance, as defined under CERCLA section 101(14), in an amount equal to or greater than the RQ for that substance. The reporting requirements are further codified in 40 CFR 302.6. If this action is finalized, any person in charge of a vessel or facility as soon as he or she has knowledge of a release from such vessel or facility of one pound or more of PFOA or PFOS in a 24-hour period is required to immediately notify the NRC in accordance with 40 CFR part 302. EPA solicits comments on the number of small entities affected by and the estimated cost impacts on small entities from these reporting requirements. In addition to these CERCLA reporting requirements, EPCRA section 304 also requires owners or operators of facilities to immediately notify their SERC (or TERC) and LEPC (or TEPC) when there is a release of a CERCLA hazardous substance in an amount equal to or greater than the RQ for that substance within a 24-hour period. EPCRA section 304 requires these facilities to submit a follow-up written report to the SERC (or TERC) and LEPC (or TEPC) within 30 days of the release.”).

[25]Id. at 54429.

[26]Id.

[27]Id.

[28]Id. at 54416-55417 (listing the potentially affected US industries as: aviation operations; carpet manufacturers; car washes; chemical manufacturing; chrome electroplating, anodizing, and etching services; coatings, paints and varnish manufacturers; firefighting foam manufacturers; landfills; medical devices; municipal fire departments and firefighting training centers; including federal agencies that use, trained with, and tested firefighting foams, paper mills, pesticides and insecticides; petroleum and coal product manufacturing, petroleum refineries and terminals, photographic film manufacturers, polish, wax, and cleaning product manufacturers; polymer manufacturers, printing facilities where inks are used in photolithography, textile mills (textiles and upholstery), waste management and remediation services; wastewater treatment plants).

[29]Id. at 554416.

[30]U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “EPA Proposes Designating Certain PFAS Chemicals as Hazardous Substances Under Superfund to Protect People’s Health,” last updated August 31, 2022, available at https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-proposes-designating-certain-pfas-chemicals-hazardous-substances-under-superfund

[31]Id.

[32]Id.

[33]Safer States, “PFAS,” last visited March 30, 2023, available at  https://www.saferstates.com/toxic-chemicals/pfas/ (stating that Eleven states including CA, CO, CT, HI, ME, MD, MN, NY, RI, VT, and WA have enacted phase-outs of PFAS in food packaging. Five states including CA, CO, MD, ME, and VT have adopted restrictions on PFAS in carpets, rugs, and aftermarket treatments and regulatory action is pending on these products and other home textiles in WA. CO adopted restrictions on indoor and outdoor furniture as well as oil and gas products. CA is phasing out PFAS in children’s products, and VT has banned PFAS in ski wax. Three states including CA, CO, and MD are taking action to eliminate PFAS in cosmetics. Eleven states including CA, CO, CT, HI, IL, ME, MD, NH, NY, VT, and WA have put in place bans on the sale of firefighting foam containing PFAS)

[34]Id.

[35]40 CFR Part 302; September 6. 2022, 87 FR 54415, pages 54415-54442 comment period ended 11/7/2022 at p. 54418 (stating that in addition to this action, in 2022, EPA will be developing an advance notice of proposed rulemaking seeking comments and data to assist in the development of potential future regulations pertaining to other PFAS designation as hazardous substances under CERCLA).

[36] Id. at 54417.

[37]Id. at 54430.

[38]Environ. Working Group, “What Are PFAS Chemicals” last visited March 30, 2023, available at https://www.ewg.org/what-are-pfas-chemicals.

[39] Id.

[40]Environ. Working Group, “What Are PFAS Chemicals” last visited March 30, 2023, available at https://www.ewg.org/what-are-pfas-chemicals.

[41]Id.

[42]Environ. Sci. Technol. Lett. “Scientific Basis for Managing PFAS as a Chemical Class” 2020, 7, 532−543 (providing examples of cases in which substances with common chemical characteristics are currently managed as a class include organophosphate pesticides, organochlorine pesticides, and organohalogen flame retardants).

[43]Id.

[44]Designation of Perfluorooctanoic Acid (PFOA) and Perfluorooctanesulfonic Acid (PFOS) as CERCLA Hazardous Substances, 87 Fed. Reg. 54415, 54417 (proposed Sept. 6, 2022) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 302) (emphasis added).

[45]Environ. Sci. Technol. Lett. “Scientific Basis for Managing PFAS as a Chemical Class” 2020, 7, 532−543.

Analysis of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and Specific National Legislation Regarding Trophy Hunting Activities

MARCH 22, 2023   /  KATHRYN LODEN*

 

I. Introduction

The protection and promotion of wild plants and animals is a critical yet controversial element of international environmental law. For centuries, unregulated and exploitative trophy hunting and trade of species occurred, often to the point of significant reductions in population sizes, genetic instability, and damaged ecosystems. Recognizing the dangers of these unregulated activities, the international community established the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) “the Convention.” To implement the objectives of CITES, each nation party to the convention must enact domestic legislation according to the National Legislation Project. The purpose of this paper is to conduct a comparative analysis of nations from each of the three categories under the CITES National Legislation Project to understand the causes and effects of different implementation strategies such as the competing interests of state sovereignty and economic development versus wildlife conservation, the effect of noncompliant states and weak legislation on the functionality of the Convention as a whole, and the impact of illegal trade in wildlife on international treaties.

 

II. History of International Trophy Hunting

International trophy hunting is a global industry that generates billions of dollars per year and impacts biodiversity, wildlife conservation, international trade, domestic and international economics, and public opinion. A sport-hunted trophy is defined in U.S. law as:

“a whole dead animal or a readily recognizable part or derivative of an animal specifically identified on accompanying CITES documents that meets the following criteria: is raw, processed, or manufactured; was legally obtained by the hunter through hunting for his or her personal use; is being imported, exported, or re-exported by or on behalf of the hunter as part of the transfer from its country of origin ultimately to the hunter’s country of usual residence; and includes worked, manufactured, or handicraft items made from the sport hunted animal…”[1]

Sport-hunted trophies vary greatly in size, value, and location and include items such as tusks, antlers, and pelts; as well as entire animals namely elephants, lions, leopards, and rhinoceroses among other various plant species.

This practice has a long and controversial history with origins dating back to the Roman Empire and Ancient Egypt.[2] Modern international trophy hunting can be said to have originated in the late 19th century with President Theodore Roosevelt and the founding of the Boone & Crockett Club and Scoring System.[3] Following shortly thereafter, the Horn Measurements and Weights of the Great Game of the World was created,[4] leading to the International Council for Game and Wildlife Conservation. Over the last few decades, international trophy hunting has increased and expanded at significant rates. Concerns over regulation, conservation, and sustainability produced the need for a binding international agreement and cooperation among importing and exporting nations as well as individual hunters. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) was drafted in the 1960s in response to these concerns. Currently, there are 183 nations party to the agreement and varying degrees of protection for more than 37,000 species of plants and animals.[5]

III. Overview of CITES

CITES is an international agreement for the purpose of ensuring that “international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten the survival of the species.”[6] While CITES is a binding agreement on the Parties, the Convention does not create domestic law, but rather provides a framework for parties to base their own legislation. Each party must adopt its own laws to ensure that CITES is implemented on a domestic level.

A. History

The Convention was constructed to address concerns over the sustainability, regulation, and environmental impact of international trophy hunting, and quickly developed into an enduring global framework. CITES was signed in Washington D.C. in March of 1973 and has been amended twice in 1979 and 1983. The convention separates species into three categories: Appendix I for “all species threatened with extinction which are or may be affected by trade,” Appendix II for “all species which although not necessarily now threatened with extinction may become so unless trade…is subject to strict regulation,” and Appendix III which includes “all species which any Party identifies as being subject to regulation…for the purpose of preventing or restricting exploitation.”[7] Species listed under these appendices require proof of both an export and import permit in order to qualify for trade.[8] The attainability of these permits varies based on the level of threat to the species, though there are some exceptions such as for species bred in captivity. Each party to the convention is required to enforce the provisions of the convention, maintain records of trade, and prepare periodic reports on their implementation processes among other things.[9]

In the nearly fifty years since the adoption of CITES, regulations on the export and import of endangered species have reduced the over-exploitation of many species such as elephants, rhinoceroses, and leopards. There has also been an increase in awareness and consciousness regarding the consequences of international trade in wildlife.[10] Despite these successes, there are considerable differences in the implementation of CITES among nations and the problem of exploitative and unsustainable trophy hunting is still rampant across every continent.

B. Export Quotas

In order to regulate the import and export of specimens, the convention established an export quota system to serve as a “management tool, used to ensure that exports of specimens of a certain species are maintained at a level that has no detrimental effect on the population of the species.”[11] A quota is an upper limit on the number of specimens of a given species that may be exported from a particular country over a 12-month period. This system accounts for the unique needs of various species as well as the ecosystems they are a part of and the impact of hunting on their sustainability. While this export system has the ability to monitor trade and regulate hunting practices between nations and on a regional level, the system has flaws including the inability to account for time-sensitive factors such as climate issues like drought, famine, wildfires, hurricanes, and other natural disasters as well as the possibility of other unforeseeable events that affect the number of specimens in a given country. Setting a quota without consideration of these factors increases the likelihood of over-exploitation.

C. Permits Systems

At the twelfth meeting of the Conference of the Parties, a universal permit system was created for the purpose of simplifying the process of producing and obtaining permits for trade in wildlife and to discourage fraudulent and or exploitative uses of permits and certificates.[12] In standardizing the permit system, the Parties agreed that permits must contain, among other things, the purpose of the transaction, the reason for trade, the intended use of the specimens, source and final destination of the specimens, quantity and type of specimens, as well as a statement of compliance to specific parameters such as quotas.[13] These permits must be either in paper or electronic form and must include the name of the applicant, number of permit, and a stamp or seal of the issuing authority.

Despite the high hopes for this unified system, notable and widespread abuses of permits and certificates have been documented over the last decade. These abuses include: intentional declaration of false information by applicants, unauthorized modification of documents after issue, improper expedition of permit obtaining process, counterfeit documents, reuse or repeated use of documents, and expired or stolen documents.[14] These abuses are due, in part, to corruption among government officials caused by financial incentives, challenging and overburdensome bureaucratic processes, and wide discretion given to decision-makers.

D. Compliance

In regard to compliance with the Convention, the Conference of Parties released a non-legally binding guide to inform and assist the Parties in meeting their obligations. The guide covers issues such as designating authorities, regulating trade according to the convention, domestic implementation, and maintenance of records and reports. Matters of compliance are handled in a “supportive and non-adversarial,”[15] manner through the Secretariat and Conference of Parties. Parties’ compliance with obligations are primarily monitored through annual reports, legislative texts, and responses to information requests. Parties are given a “reasonable,”[16] amount of time to address and rectify compliance issues once they are discovered. If a Party fails to take action, the Standing Committee may do one or more of the following: provide advice, information, and assistance; request special reporting; issue a caution; recommend specific actions; send a public notification to all Parties regarding the non-complying Party; issue a warning; or recommend the suspension of trade.[17]

These compliance procedures have had a seemingly positive impact on Parties’ compliance to the Convention. Many countries that have been subject to recommendations of trade suspensions have made efforts to improve their procedures. However, there have been several cases of countries refusing to implement trade restrictions or failing to respond to compliance recommendations.[18]

E. National Legislation Project

Given that CITES does not create domestic law, each Party is tasked with adopting their own legislation to implement the provisions of the Convention. The National Legislation Project, established in 1992, was designed to aid Parties by identifying provisions that their domestic legislation should contain. Each domestic policy should provide the Parties with the authority to: “designate at least one management authority and one scientific authority; prohibit trade in specimens in violation of the convention; penalize such trade; or confiscate specimens illegally traded or possessed.”[19] The Secretariat reviews and evaluates each Party’s national laws and places them into one of three categories.

In assessing the implementation of the four requirements outlined in the Convention, the Secretariat looks to several factors. Regarding the designation of authorities, the Secretariat will look for a specific legal instrument that clearly provides CITES authorities the power to grant permits, establish quotas, and review reports. Next in regard to the prohibition of trade, the Secretariat will look for legislation regulating all forms of trade in all species and specimens listed by the Convention. Third, regarding the penalization of illegal trade, the Secretariat will look for legislation that clearly defines prohibited actions and outlines specific punishments for violating the provisions. Finally, for a Party to adequately meet the fourth requirement, the legislation must enable permanent confiscation of illegally trades specimens as well as the equipment used in the offense.[20]

IV. Analysis and Comparison of International CITES Implementations

Countries party to the Convention are divided into three categories based on the ability of their domestic legislation to meet the four major requirements of the National Legislation Project. Category 1 includes countries whose legislation is believed to generally meet the requirements for the implementation of CITES; Category 2 includes countries whose legislation is believed not to generally meet all of the requirements for the implementation of CITES; and Category 3 which includes the remaining nations, whose legislation is believed generally to not meet the requirements for the implementation of CITES. [21]

A. Category 1 – Countries that Have Met CITES Requirements

Category 1 countries are those that the Secretariat has found to have met the four major requirements of the Convention through their domestic legislation. Countries in this category represent the six continents and include primarily developed states.

1. South Africa

South Africa was one of the first nations to join CITES in 1975 and has been considered an active participant in the Convention. This country is home to the “Big Five,” a term that was coined by trophy hunters in reference to lions, leopards, rhinoceroses, elephants, and Cape buffalo, which are all highly valued and consequentially highly exploited species. South Africa is one of the most popular locations for trophy hunting generating an estimated $100 million per year according to the nation’s DEA (Department of Environmental Affairs).[22] While South Africa has been applauded by the CITES community for its efforts in regulating international trade in wildlife, many critical issues exist in the application of legislation leading to the continuation of exploitative practices.

a. Legislation

In 2004, the country enacted the National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act  “NEMBA,”[23] to implement CITES. NEMBA sets out to manage and conserve biological diversity within the country and to promote sustainable use of indigenous biological resources while also giving effect to the Convention.[24] Established by NEMBA is the Managing Authority, the South African National Biodiversity Institute, which is broadly tasked with establishing, maintaining, preserving, and protecting plants and animals in the country. NEBMA also establishes a Scientific Authority in compliance with the Convention.[25] The Scientific Authority has the power to monitor the legal and illegal trade of specimens, advise the Minister on various issues, make recommendations on permit applications and assist the Minister with enforcement procedures.[26] In addition to these authorities, the legislation outlines a “national biodiversity framework,”[27] to create a uniform approach to the management of biodiversity aimed at “ensuring the long-term survival in nature of the species.” Within this plan is the designation of “threatened or protected ecosystems and species,” which categorizes species and systems as either critically endangered, endangered, vulnerable, or protected.[28] To engage in trade of threatened or protected species, South Africa has adopted the permit system recommended by the Convention.[29]

b. Application of NEMBA

Despite being given a position in the highest category of compliance to the Convention and receiving praise from both the international community and the South African government, exploitative trade in wildlife remains a significant problem in South Africa. A practice called canned hunting, “trophy hunting of captive-bred lions in confined spaces,” is a major market for South Africa with over 8,000 lions being held in captivity for use in the tourist industry.[30] In 2006, the government attempted to ban canned hunting because lions are one of the species included in NEMBA. The Supreme Court of Appeals held that this practice was outside of the regulatory capacity of the government because “the breeding of lions in captivity plays no role in the conservation and survival of lions as a species.”[31] Additionally, while the international trade in rhinoceros horns was banned by CITES in 1977,[32] South Africa’s Constitutional Court recently made the controversial decision to lift the ban on the domestic trade of horns[33] despite concerns from the government regarding difficulties in regulating and monitoring trade and the potential impact on the conservation of the species. This decision came shortly after South Africa hosted the 17th Conference of the Parties to CITES in 2016.

c. Evaluation of NEMBA

South Africa may have met the requirements of the National Legislation Project through the enactment of NEMBA but in application, this legislation has significant failures. The Act establishes both a management and scientific authority, prohibits trade in endangered species, penalizes such trade, and provides mechanisms for confiscating illegally traded specimens. However, in practice, NEMBA falls short of providing the government with substantive power to regulate trade in wildlife demonstrated by the court decisions regarding canned hunting of lions and domestic trade of rhinoceros horns, both of which activities are directly opposed by CITES. NEMBA presents several administrative concerns such as a lack of cohesive, integrated policies allowing for differences in trade across the country; inadequate coverage for threatened and endangered species; too much discretion in the issuance of permits for trade; inconsistent terminology between provinces; discrepancies in punishments for violations between provinces, and inadequate resources allocated to both regional and national authorities.[34] Despite these concerns, the implementation of NEMBA in accordance with CITES has led to some positive results including “a marked increase in the numbers of southern right whales and humpback whales.”[35]

2. Thailand

Thailand is considered a regional leader in the effort to combat illegal trade of ivory and was removed from the list of countries affected by this industry.[36] While this advancement is certainly commendable, several legal loopholes in the law allow for exploitative practices and gaps in protection for many species.[37]

a. Legislation

Thailand became a party to CITES in 1983 and was placed in Category 1 under the National Legislation Project for sufficiently enforcing the major goals of the Convention through the enactment of the Wild Animal Preservation and Protection Act, B.E. 2535, “WARPA,”[38] in 1992. WARPA was amended in 2003 and again in 2014. According to the Secretariat, WARPA is in compliance with the Convention. The Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation of the Ministry of Natural Resources (DNP) fulfills both the requirements for a management authority and scientific authority. In addition to the DNP, the Department of Fisheries and the Forest Department have the authority and responsibility to administer WARPA. WARPA provides these departments with the power to penalize trade, issue permits, and provide for the confiscation of illegally traded specimens.[39] The original version of WARPA listed only fifteen preserved species of wildlife that cannot be hunted or traded without permission from the Director-General. Since the amendment in 2014, WARPA still protects “fewer than half of all the CITES-listed taxa, and includes just 12 non-native CITES-listed species.”[40]

b. Application of WARPA

Major challenges in regulating trade in wildlife exist in Thailand especially in regard to two important native species; the elephant and the tiger. Prior to 2015, Thailand was considered a country of “primary concern,” due to its domestic and international ivory trade. The elephant population shrunk dramatically from 300,000 wild and 100,000 domesticated animals at the beginning of the 20th century to only 3,000 wild and 3,700 domesticated individuals in 2017.[41] With the passage of the National Ivory Act, Thailand has seen great improvement in the control of trade and the ability to fight illegal poaching. In contrast to the improving condition of elephants in Thailand, the exploitation of tigers within the country is of growing concern. Legal possession of tigers in Thailand is restricted to non-commercial licensed zoos. As of March 2017, 49 licensed zoos in the country housed 1,287 tigers.[42] Breeding of these tigers is strictly prohibited. In 2016, the Royal Thai Police conducted an investigation and eventual raid of the Tiger Temple near Bangkok. During the raid, “a total of 137 tigers were removed to a rehabilitation centre, 40 deceased tiger cubs were found in a freezer, and a further 20 preserved in jars.”[43] This raid found evidence that the breeding of captive tigers has been occurring for decades in many zoos.

c. Evaluation of WARPA

Despite meeting the criteria, WARPA has several inherent weaknesses that make enforcement of CITES very difficult. The definition section provides loopholes for trade in wildlife that are not compatible with CITES. First, the definition of “trade,” used by WARPA does not align with the definition established by CITES. WARPA includes import, export, and transit but does not include re-export and introduction from the sea. Second, while cross-border import and export of specimens are regulated under the Act, domestic trade is not. Meaning that once a specimen is inside the country, the government has limited ability to impose any control. This has created an environment where “animals are smuggled into Thailand and laundered as captive-bred specimens throughout the world.”[44] Additionally, the burden of proof falls on the government rather than individual possessors to establish whether a specimen in the country has been illegally trafficked. Third, WARPA does not provide for the protection of many non-native species, even those listed in CITES such as the six species of great ape. Finally, the process of confiscating illegally trafficked specimens is not clearly defined in the legislation which contributes to confusing and delayed legal proceedings. Like South Africa, Thailand has theoretically enacted legislation to further the mission of CITES but is hindered by administrative barriers such as lack of regulatory capabilities in addition to the WARPA specific problem of weak and inconsistent language.

3. Germany

Germany became a party to CITES in 1976. Unlike the previous two nations which are high exporters of sport-hunted trophies, Germany plays a significant role in the import of wildlife. Germany is the second-largest importer of specimens[45] (after the U.S.), is home to one of the highest populations of trophy hunters[46], and hosts some of the largest hunting fairs in the world.[47] A majority of Germany’s imports come from Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Russia[48] and include animals such as zebras, black and brown bears, and elephants.

a. Legislation

In 2010, Germany entered into force the Act on Nature Conservation and Landscape Management (Federal Nature Conservation Act) “FNCA,” for the purpose of safeguarding biological diversity, balanced and sustainable resources, and the natural beauty and recreational value of the environment.[49] In compliance with the Convention, FNCA established the Federal Agency for Nature Conservation as both the Management and Scientific Authority. FNCA contains 74 articles including provisions regarding the general and special protections of species, duties and responsibilities of government authorities and individuals, the processes and availability of obtaining permits and licenses for the trade in wildlife, as well as penalties and confiscation provisions in the event of a violation. In many aspects, this legislation is highly detailed and expansive.[50] However, when it comes to the import of species from other nations, FNCA is notably lenient. According to Article 45, animals and plants of specially protected species that were “legally bred in captivity,” or “imported into the Community from third countries,” are exempt from the prohibition on possession.[51]

b. Application of FNCA

While there are guidelines in place to review the applications of import permits, data shows that the Federal Agency for Nature Conservation accepts nearly all of these applications, even for protected and endangered species.[52] In addition to legal trade in wildlife, there is a substantial criminal enterprise in Germany that smuggles specimens across the borders. Germany is considered a transit country for illegal ivory trade between originating Africa and South-East Asian destination countries.[53] Between 2005-2014, German authorities confiscated over 25 shipments containing over 160kg of ivory[54]. These specimens included carvings, earrings and other jewelry, as well as tusks and toenails.[55] Additionally, Germany is a destination country for the import of domestic pets, dietary supplements, and rare plant species.[56] Between 2005-2014, government officials confiscated thousands of shipments containing specimens such as 370 tortoises, bird eggs, 2600 dead songbirds, 1.4 tons of caviar, 500 cacti, 40 turtle eggs, 253 live orchids, 98 rare tortoises and turtles, lizards and snakes, and rhino horns, 143 protected live reptiles, 570 exotic reptiles, and various oils made from cacti.[57] While these shipments were violations of domestic and international law, there are several legal routes to get protected species of wildlife into the country. For example, Germany is also the host of the world’s largest trophy hunting fair, Jagd & Hund. At this event, some individuals sell and trade trophies from hunts while others sell hunting excursions, mostly in Southern and Western Africa, for specimens that are prohibited by both CITES and the EU.[58]

c. Evaluation of FNCA

Germany plays a significant role in the international trade of wildlife. Because Germany has been listed as a Category 1 nation, the Secretariat has determined that the country is generally acting in compliance with CITES, and based solely on a reading of FNCA, this determination would be correct. Germany does meet the four major obligations of the National Legislation Project. However, the lenient language and application of permits allow for Germany to import specimens that have been illegally or exploitatively hunted in other nations and also to hold hunting fairs where thousands of specimens of protected species are on display or advertised.

B. Category 2 – Countries that Have Generally Not Met CITES Requirements

Category 2 countries are those whose legislation is generally believed to not meet all four of the criteria necessary to be considered in compliance with the National Legislation Project. Some of these nations are actively working towards compliance while others are not. Like Category 1, Category 2 includes nations from each continent but only includes those with either transitioning or developing economies.

 

1. Botswana

Botswana became a party to the Convention in 1978 and has maintained its status as a controversial actor ever since. Botswana is home to the world’s largest African elephant population with just over 30% of the continental population.[59] With this population size comes an increased risk of exploitative practices to feed the still powerful international ivory trade, and therefore an increased responsibility of the government to protect and promote the species. Botswana also contains a large yet dwindling population of African lions. Due to the government’s inability to protect these and other species through mostly ineffective legislation, Botswana has been placed in Category 2 under the National Legislation Project.

a. Legislation

Botswana enacted the Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act “WCNPA,” in 1992 “for the conservation and management of the wildlife in Botswana.”[60] The WCNPA established the Directors of the Department of Wildlife and National Parks and the Department of Forestry and Range Resources as the Management Authorities and Scientific Authorities in compliance with the Convention.[61] While the legislation does technically ban some forms of hunting and trade and provides mechanisms to penalize illegal trade and to confiscate specimens; overly lenient language means that these mechanisms are rarely called upon. The language of WNCPA provides the government nearly unlimited power to grant permits for trophy hunting. For example, under Part VIII of the Act, the Director may grant a permit authorizing “the killing or capturing of any animal in the interests of the conservation, management, control or utilization of wildlife,”[62] this subjective language allows for essentially unrestricted hunting of wildlife. WCNPA designates 52 controlled hunting areas in the Ngamiland District, 12 areas in the Chobe District, 4 areas in the Central District, and 14 areas in the Ghanzi District making up a significant portion of the country’s natural landscape and wildlife habitats.[63] The Director also established 9 wildlife management areas and 4 national parks throughout the country where hunting is either restricted or prohibited, unless the Director determines that “such a killing or capturing is necessary for scientific purposes…or in the interests of the conservation, management, control or utilization of wildlife.”[64]

b. Application of WNCPA

Botswana recently gained international attention for the decision to lift a five-year ban on elephant hunting.[65] This ban was initially created by President Ian Khama in 2014 to protect the species from poachers and trophy hunters. This policy was considered by many to be excessively strict as it included arming anti-poaching units to shoot known poachers on sight.[66] There is notable debate over the true population size of elephants in Botswana and continentally owing to governmental corruption and difficulty of reporting on migratory species, but some statistics demonstrate that the elephant hunting ban helped to reverse the decline. The current Botswana administration justified lifting the ban by emphasizing the destruction to rural areas of the country that elephants have created.[67] Generally, policies regarding elephants in Botswana are two-fold. First, there is a need to conserve the species for genetic stability and biodiversity as well as for the tourism industry which is largely fueled by wildlife activities. Second, there is a need to manage populations because of the negative effects of human-elephant interactions such as the impact on crops, livestock, water supply, buildings, and human lives. Many conservationists argue that this policy had little to do with elephant destruction and more to do with the political motivations of the administration.[68]

c. Evaluation of WNCPA

It is evident from the return to elephant poaching and hunting that Botswana’s legislation is not capable of protecting this endangered species nor was it particularly designed to do so. While there is international outrage from other countries as well as nonprofit organizations regarding Botswana’s elephant policies, addressing this issue from a greater context reveals that this developing nation may be acting on its best financial interests to the detriment of its natural resources. The demand for ivory exists, especially in countries like China, France, UK, and the United States, in spite of CITES and other international ivory bans.[69] With a rich population of elephants and an economy dependent upon tourism and wildlife activities, Botswana is uniquely positioned to fill this demand. Even though many countries play a role in the continuation of illegal ivory trade, developing nations often receive the most blame and consequences.

2. Namibia

Namibia joined the Convention in 1990 and has been placed in Category 2 under the National Legislation Project for generally failing to meet the four major criteria. Over the past few years, frustrations towards CITES and the international community over bans on the ivory trade have grown in Namibia causing the government to seriously consider pulling out of the Convention. This government, in addition to other African nations, has frequently petitioned the Conference of Parties to amend the categorization of specific species allowing for increased trade. These proposals have been routinely rejected contributing to the growing tension among African nations.

a. Legislation

In 2008, Namibia introduced the Controlled Wildlife Products and Trade Act “CWPTA,” to give force to the provisions of the Convention.[70] CWPTA established the Ministry of Environment and Tourism as both the Management and Scientific Authorities. This short legislation prohibits the import, export, re-export, or introduction from the sea of any specimen listed in the convention unless authorized by a permit. Additionally, CWPTA includes specific penalties for violations including a maximum of 20 years in prison or a maximum fine of N$200,000.[71] Despite meeting the four requirements of the National Legislation Project, this legislation is regarded as noncompliant due to the application and enforcement mechanisms as well as the government’s refusal to accept classification of certain species.

b. Application of CWPTA

In 2013, Namibia first proposed that the CITES amendment regarding African elephants be changed to allow for a quota export of ivory as well as trade in ivory products and goods.[72] Then in 2016, Namibia sent another proposal to the Conference of Parties to loosen restrictions on ivory trade for African countries.[73] In 2019, Namibia, along with Angola, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Zambia, again proposed that the ban on ivory trade be lifted.[74] These proposals, in addition to separate proposals regarding lessening restrictions on trade and hunting of rhinoceroses and giraffes in Africa, were ultimately rejected by the Conference. Namibia in particular views these decisions as an unwanted and unnecessary interference with domestic conservation and control efforts. Within the last month, there have been discussions surrounding the potential for Namibia to begin exporting live elephants in direct defiance of the Convention. [75]

c. Evaluation of CWPTA

Much of Namibia’s argument stems from the belief that elephants, rhinos, giraffes, and all other species native to the country are simply natural resources to be used and traded as the government sees fit. After the proposal rejection in 2019, Minister Pohamba Shifeta said “there is a limit to how much external interference we will accept,”[76] in reference to the regulation of ivory trade. Namibia has argued that species conservation is an issue of state sovereignty and not international politics. The government has attempted to justify their interest in relaxed regulations by stating that there is a need to protect rural communities. While this interest is relevant, the main incentive driving these proposals appears to be the money gained from selling off ivory stockpiles and opening the country to further trophy hunting. Concerns over state sovereignty are becoming more prevalent as developing nations seek to lift restrictions on trade.

3. The Philippines

The Philippines became Party to the Convention in 1981. The country is home to many CITES-listed species including 46 from Appendix I, 1,955 from Appendix II, and 6 from Appendix III. The state has been placed into Category 2 for failure to meet all of the requirements of the Convention. Like many countries, the Philippines is a consumer, source, and transit point for trade in wildlife. Despite ambitious legislation, the application and enforcement of CITES have been difficult for the Philippines due to the high demand for native species and illegal trade networks.

a. Legislation

In 2001, the Philippines adopted the Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection Act “WRCPA,” to “conserve and protect wildlife species and their habitats to promote ecological balance and enhance biological diversity.”[77] WRCPA designates the Protected Areas and Wildlife Bureau and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources as the Scientific and Management Authorities with the power to regulate trade, issue permits, prohibit trade of CITES-listed species, penalize illegal trade, and confiscate specimen involved in trade. With respect to the indigenous populations of the State, WRCPA provides exceptions to hunting and fishing regulations done for religious or cultural purposes.[78]

b. Application of WRCPA

One of the major issues facing the Philippines with regards to the implementation of the Convention is the trade of seahorses. In 2004, CITES added all 47 species of seahorses to Appendix II meaning that all Parties are required to ensure that trade will be limited to legal sources, captive environments, as to not damage the wild populations.[79] Prior to this amendment, in an attempt to comply with the Convention, the Philippines passed Republic Act (RA) 8550 Section 97 which states that “it shall be unlawful to fish or take rare, threatened or endangered species as listed in the CITES,”[80] without distinction among the Appendices. When CITES amended the classification of seahorses, RA 8550 effectively imposed a blanket ban on the export of the species which was previously a significant market for the country. Prior to 2004, the Philippines was estimated to have exported between 2 million and 6 million dried seahorses annually.[81] Many countries, specifically China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, still have high demand for seahorse specimens for use in traditional medicines[82] and despite the blanket ban on export, the Philippines is still a major contributor to this market.[83]

c. Evaluation of WRCPA

Because RA 8550 does not account for the distinctions between Appendices, the law is in conflict with other states’ trade provisions and more broadly with CITES. A less strict domestic law would allow for the Philippines to regulate and monitor trade to harmonize the interests of conservation and economic development. Consequentially, the banning of all exports has not reduced trade in any capacity but rather opened the market for unregulated and exploitative practices. Despite the ambitious attempt to regulate trade in wildlife through strict legislation, the Philippines has been generally unable to meet the requirements of the Convention because the domestic legislation is incompatible with CITES and the current state of trade in specific species.

C. Category 3 – Countries that Do Not Meet CITES Requirements

Category 3 countries are those whose legislation is believed to generally not meet the requirements for the implementation of CITES. These countries are typically newer to the convention and include only economically developing states.

1. Belize

Belize became Party to the Convention in 1981 but didn’t demonstrate much commitment for several years. Like many developing nations, Belize is considered resource-dependent meaning that natural resources available in the country are highly important economically – in tourism, fisheries, agriculture, and forestry industries – as well as for basic needs such as food, medicine, and building materials.[84] The main resources used in trade are timber, specifically rosewood, mahogany, and cedar; various species of deer; aquatic species, specifically conch, lobster, and sharks; as well as various birds and exotic plants.[85]Belize was placed in Category 3 because it has not met the requirements of the Convention.

a. Legislation

Belize has not yet enacted legislation giving force to the Convention but it has made some progress. In 1981, Belize introduced the Wildlife Protection Act “WPA,” which was amended in 1990 and 2000.[86] Belize has not yet established a Scientific Authority but the Ministry of Sustainable Development, Climate Change and Disaster Risk operates as the Management Authority. The WPA prohibits the hunting and possession of species listed in the Act, the hunting and possession of any wildlife without a license as well as carrying a weapon or other means of hunting. Section 15 provides the Game Warden with the power to “issue permits for the import into or export out of Belize of specimens of wildlife or parts thereof.”[87] This legislation is not considered to be in compliance because it does not give force to the provisions of the convention such as protection for CITES-listed species or regulating international trade.

b. Application of WPA

As a result of outdated and difficult to enforce legislation, Belize is faced with unregulated activities harming the sustainability and survivability of many natural resources. One of the greatest environmental threats facing the country is deforestation. Due to illegal logging practices and a shift from forestry to agriculture as the primary economic driver, rapid deforestation has taken place across the country. As of 2010, Belize was experiencing deforestation at a rate of 2.3% which is double the average rate for Central America.[88]In some areas of the country, the deforestation rate is at 13%.[89] Current legislation in Belize incentivizes landowners to clear forested areas in order to develop them for other uses. The rate of deforestation has only accelerated since 2010. Between 2010 and 2012, Belize’s forest cover was reduced by 25,264 hectares which is an increase of about 2,000 ha per year from previous rates.[90]

c. Evaluation of WPA

Under CITES, several species of timber are protected and regulated.[91] This includes species that native to Belize and other countries in the region such as rosewood, mahogany, and cedar. Enacting updated legislation with specific connections to CITES would give the country power to regulate the valuable and diminishing timber industry. Simply enacting legislation without more would not solve the problem of deforestation given the expansive criminal enterprise dedicated to trade in timber[92] but it would be a productive step for the state to take.

2. Somalia

Somalia became Party to the Convention in 1986 but has failed to ratify legislation giving force to CITES and has therefore been placed in Category 3. In 2004, the Conference of Parties made a recommendation to suspend all commercial trade in specimens with Somalia due to the country’s lack of appropriate legislation.[93] As of October 2021, this recommendation is still in effect.[94] Despite not having a legislative act to enforce the Convention, Somalia has made several efforts to regulate trade in wildlife.

a. Legislation and Evaluation

Over the last few years, Somalia’s Environment Ministry has been working to combat the illegal trafficking of cheetahs from Eastern Africa to Gulf countries. Somalia is both a range country and transit point for illegal trafficking of cheetahs making regulation more difficult. According to a study on 145 cases involving trafficked cheetahs, a majority of the recorded specimen in this industry are in Somaliland[95], which is a self-declared autonomous region of Somalia that does not consider itself to be a part of greater Somalia. Over 70% of recorded cases between 2010-2020 were recorded in Somaliland.[96] After being captured in Eastern Africa, cheetahs are transported to countries such as Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia to be used as exotic pets. In October of 2020, The Somaliland Ministry of Environment and Rural Development working with Somaliland police secured the arrest of 10 individuals suspected in trafficking a total of cheetah cubs.[97] While this arrest and confiscation of specimens is admirable, it does not begin to scratch the surface of the illegal trafficking problem taking place in Somalia and across the Horn of Africa.

Somalia is a unique and challenging nation in that is has no central government structure in place[98]. Due to political and economic instability within the country dating back decades, Somalia is at an even greater disadvantage in the fight against illegal trade in wildlife. Without a formal regulatory body or legislation to enforce, the exploitation of natural resources was an inevitable consequence.

V. Discussion

There are several issues to consider when comparing the implementation strategies of various states under the Convention. First, the competing interests of state sovereignty and economic development versus wildlife conservation and the inherent power dynamics responsible for shaping these perspectives. Second, the effect of noncompliant states and weak legislation on the functionality of the Convention as a whole. And third, the impact of illegal trade in wildlife on international treaties.

The conflict between state sovereignty and wildlife conservation is a relatively new phenomenon. With the emergence of animal protection groups came a movement focused on the morality of hunting and trade.[99] This ideology disproportionately affects developing nations trying to compete on a global market as well as indigenous communities who use sustainable practices necessary for their survival and cultural identities. Developed nations have a long history of exploiting resources domestically and internationally for the purpose of economic development. Though detrimental to the environment, this strategy led to rapid industrialization, medical and technological advancements, and improved quality of human life. Developing countries looking to follow this example are now faced with Western ideologies and standards restricting the same processes that developed countries took advantage of only decades earlier. The “sovereign right of a country to sustainably exploit its natural genetic resources, and benefit when those resources are used by others,”[100] otherwise known as access and benefit sharing, is one of the foundational elements of globalization and international trade. For Western nations to restrict this process of trade and economic growth is to deprive developing nations of their sovereign right to utilize their natural resources. One of the underlying sources of this conflict is the use of the word “sustainable,” and the determination of who has the power to define it. Many developing countries would prefer a self-determination approach giving them the power to utilize resources within their own economic, cultural, and recreational confines while developed countries would opt for uniformity where hunting and trade regulations are applied equally to all parties. Understandably, this issue has created tension between the developing and developed world which threatens not only the enforceability of the Convention but its likelihood of survival as well. If these concerns are not addressed, it is more than likely that nations such as Namibia will forego the Convention all together and resume exploitative and unregulated trade in wildlife. This could create a domino effect and lead to the eventual deterioration of the Convention and the progress made thus far.

For any international treaty to be effective, each party must fulfill its obligations and commit to the implementation and enforcement of the provisions. This is made more difficult when states have different goals, procedures, and needs addressed in their domestic legislation. In each category under the National Legislation Project there are countries committed to the Convention and countries taking advantage of economically established power dynamics. Importantly, many nations who facially appear to be committed to the Convention are frequently the worst contributors to illegal and exploitative trade in wildlife. In one way or another, every country benefits from exploitative hunting and trade. For example, developed import-based countries like Germany benefit from these practices by receiving the products, hosting conventions, and participating in hunting excursions. Developing export-based countries like Belize benefit from these practices economically through increased trade, tourism, and recreational activities. These benefits come at the cost of biodiversity among species and ecosystems which lead to further environmental consequences such as deforestation, climate change, disruption of the food chain, and famine as well as the sustainability of the planet as a whole, as all life is dependent upon a thriving natural world. In time, non-compliant and under-committed states have the potential to undermine the Convention as a whole and to detrimentally impact endangered and protected species.

Exploitative trade in endangered or protected species impacts every region of the world and threatens the enforceability of the Convention. While the general attitude towards illegal trade is that of disdain, it is clear that many countries benefit from the industry and are therefore incentivized to maintain it. Despite being in compliance with the convention, several countries in Category 1 such as the U.S., EU countries, Russia, and China are significant importers of illegally obtained sport-hunted trophies. The high demand for specimens and economic value of trade incentivizes Category 2 and 3 countries to keep their legislation lenient and for governments to underreport or directly permit illegal trafficking. Because CITES is an intentionally non-adversarial treaty, consequences for trade violations or noncompliant legislation are often not compelling enough to influence policy changes. On a domestic level, penalties for illegal trade vary nation to nation but are additionally not generally strict enough to be truly deterring. Apart from government actions, individual poachers and those involved in the trafficking industry are financially incentivized to exploit resources and to take advantage of weak regulations. It is no surprise that trafficking of wildlife occurs at significantly higher rates in economically developing nations where tourism and wildlife play a significant part in the economy and where legislation is less restrictive.

VI. Conclusion

International trade in wildlife has a long and sorted history originating with exploitative and unregulated activities that threatened thousands of species. The past 50 years have seen substantial progress in these areas through the creation of numerous international laws and treaties including CITES. While this progress is not to be diminished or ignored, it is important to address the fundamental problems in the application of the Convention across the world. Through the National Legislation Project, the Convention attempts to regulate trade in a sustainable way to promote biodiversity and wildlife conservation. One of the most important features of this treaty is the emphasis on domestic legislation. Permitting nations to enact their own legislation is a positive policy decision in that it allows countries to address their unique populations, resources, and needs. However, inconsistent domestic laws allow for differences in definitions, standards, and procedures that ought to be uniform in order to serve the purpose of enforcing an international treaty. The main differences in implementation between Category 1, 2, and 3 countries are the strengths of their legislation and the abilities to enforce them, differing interpretations of sustainable use of natural resources, and degrees of economic dependency on trade. These differences have led to various application strategies for regulating trade in wildlife allowing for many problematic practices to continue. For the Convention to accomplish the goals it set out to achieve, these differences must be addressed and reconciled.

 

*Kathryn Loden is a Juris Doctorate candidate at the University of Oregon School of Law and
anticipates graduating in May 2023. She graduated from the University of Utah in 2019 with a B.S.
in psychology and a honors B.S. in political science and has worked in the environmental law field
since entering law school.

 

[1] 50 CFR § 23.74, (2014).

[2] Blumm, M.C. & Ritchie, L., The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 Envtl. L. 673, 677, (2005).

[3] Baldus, R.D., Damm, G.R. & Wollschied, K., Best Practices in Sustainable Hunting – A Guide to Best Practices from Around the World pp. 5-11, (2008).

[4] Ward, Rowland, Horn Measurements and Weights of the Great Game of the World, Being a Record for the Use of Sportsmen and Naturalists. Nature 47, (1892).

[5] What is CITES? Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, https://cites.org/eng/disc/what.php (last visited Oct. 14, 2021).

[6] Id.

[7] Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, (1983), https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/disc/CITES-Convention-EN.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2021).

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Fish & Wildlife News – Winter 2013, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, p. 13, (2013).

[11] Conf. 14.7, Rev. CoP15, Management of Nationally Established Export Quotas, (2007).

[12] Conf. 12.3, Rev. CoP18, Permits and Certificates, (2002).

[13] Id.

[14] Outhwaite, W., Addressing Corruption in CITES Documentation Processes. Targeting Natural Resource Corruption, (2020).

[15] Conf. 14.3, Rev. CoP18, CITES compliance procedures, (2007).

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Reeve, R. Wildlife Trade, Sanctions and Compliance: Lessons from the CITES Regime. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Sep. 1, 2006, Vol. 82, No. 5 Sep. 1, (2006).

[19] Conf. 8.4, Rev. CoP15, National laws for implementation of the Convention, (1992).

[20] Implementing CITES in National Legislation, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/prog/Legislation/CITES_implementation_in_National_Legislation.pdf (last viewed on Oct. 14, 2021).

[21] Id.

[22] Saayman, A., Saayman, M., Van der Merwe, P. The Economic Impact of Trophy Hunting in the South African Wildlife Industry, Global Ecology and Conservation, Vol. 16, (2018).

[23] Government Gazette, 467, No. 26436, National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act, (2004).

[24] Id. at p. 2.

[25] Id. at § 60.

[26] Id.at § 61.

[27] Id. at § 38.

[28] Id. at § 52.

[29] Id. at Ch. 7.

[30] Bauer, H., Nowell, K., Sillero-Zubiri, C., Macdonald, D.W., Lions in the Modern Arena of Cites. Conservation Letters, (2018).

[31] SA Predator Breeders Association et al v. Minister of Environmental Affairs (72/10) [2010] ZASCA 151, (29 November 2010).

[32] Conf. 9.14, Rev. CoP17, Conservation of trade in African and Asian rhinoceroses, (1994).

[33] Kruger and Another v. Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs (57221/12) ZAGPPHC 1018, (28 November, 2015).

[34] Bodasing, A., Mulliken, T.A., South Africa’s Wildlife Trade at the Crossroads. Traffic East/Southern Africa, (1996).

[35] South Africa as a Party to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), South Africa Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment https://www.environment.gov.za/legislation/international_agreements/sapartytocites, (last viewed Oct. 14, 2021).

[36] Thailand Delisted From CITES’s List of Countries Affected by Illegal Traffic in Ivory, Thai PBS World https://www.thaipbsworld.com/thailand-delisted-from-citess-list-of-countries-affected-by-illegal-traffic-in-ivory/ (last viewed Oct. 14, 2021).

[37] Moore, P., Prompinchompoo, C., and Beastall, C.A., CITES Implementation in Thailand: A review of the legal regime governing the trade in great apes and gibbons and other CITES-listed species. TRAFFIC, (2016).

[38] Wild Animal Preservation and Protection Act, B.E. 2535, (1992).

[39] Id.

[40] Criminal Justice Response to Wildlife Crime in Thailand: a rapid assessment. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, (2017).

[41] Nijiman, V., An Assessment of the Live Elephant Trade in Thailand, TRAFFIC, (2014).

[42] See footnote 40.

[43] Ramsey, A. What Really Happened at Thailand’s Tiger Temple? Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2016/6/5/what-really-happened-at-thailands-tiger-temple (last viewed Oct. 14, 2021)

[44] See footnote 40.

[45] Killing for Trophies: An Analysis of Global Trophy Hunting Trade, International Fund for Animal Welfare, (2016).

[46] Knapp, A., A Review of the European Union’s Import Policies for Hunting Trophies, TRAFFIC, (2007).

[47] Trophy Hunting by the Numbers: the European Union’s Role in Global Trophy Hunting, Humane Society International, (2018).

[48] See footnote 45.

[49] Act on Nature Conservation and Landscape Management (Federal Nature Conservation Act-BNatSchG), July 29, 2009.

[50] Id.

[51] Id.

[52] See footnote 45.

[53] Klaas, K., Sina, S., Gerstetter, C., Wildlife Crime in Germany, European Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, (2016).

[54] Biennial Reports of the Federal Republic of Germany 2005-2014.

[55] Id.

[56] See footnote 43.

[57] See footnote 54.

[58] Brown, F., Inside Euroe’s Largest Trophy Hunting Fair Offering Cheap Deals on ‘easy’ Animal Killing Trips. Metro. https://metro.co.uk/2020/02/06/inside-europes-largest-trophy-hunting-fair-offering-cheap-deals-easy-animal-killing-trips-12187401/ (last viewed Oct, 14, 2021).

[59] Blackie, I.R., Sowa, I. Dynamics of Social Ecology of Elephant Conservation Implications on Environmental Development. Journal of African Interdisciplinary Studies, (2019).

[60] Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act, Ch. 38:01, (December 11, 1992).

[61] Id.

[62] Id.

[63] Id.

[64] Id.

[65] Lifting of The Hunting Suspension in Botswana, Press Release, Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources, Conservation and Tourism. https://www.facebook.com/www.mewt199.co.bw/posts/2293856854025306 (last viewed Oct. 14, 2021).

[66] Mogomotsi, G., Madigele, P., Live by the Gun, Die by the Gun. SA Crime Quarterly No. 60, (2017).

[67] Human-Elephant Conflict, International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). https://www.iucn.org/ssc-groups/mammals/african-elephant-specialist-group/human-elephant-conflict (last viewed Oct. 14, 2021).

[68] De Greef, K., Botswana Ends Ban on Elephant Hunting, The New York Times, (2019).

[69] UK is the Largest Supplier to the World’s Ivory Markets. Environmental Investigation Agency, (2017).

[70] Government Gazette, No. 4190, Controlled Wildlife Products and Trade Act, (2008).

[71] Id.

[72] CoP13 Prop. 7, Consideration of Proposals for Amendment of Appendices I and II, CITES, (2013).

[73] CoP17 Prop. 14, Consideration of Proposals for Amendment of Appendices I and II, CITES, (2016).

[74] CoP18 Prop. 10, Consideration of Proposals for Amendment of Appendices I and II, CITES, (2019).

[75] Statement on Trade in Live African Elephants under Articles III and IV of the Convention, CITES, (2021).

[76] Shikongo, A., Namibia Frustrated by CITES Ivory Trade Ban, The Namibian. https://www.namibian.com.na/206454/archive-read/Namibia-frustrated-by-Cites-ivory-trade-ban (last visited Oct. 14, 2021).

[77] Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection Act, Republic Act No. 9147, (2001).

[78] Id.

[79] Relating to CITES Art. IV, Regulation of Trade in Specimens of Species Included in Appendix II.

[80] The Philippines Fisheries Code, Republic Act No. 8550, (1998).

[81] Pajaro, M.G. & Vincent, A.C.J., The Catch and Export of the Seahorse Trade in the Philippines, Pre-CITES. The University of British Columbia, Fisheries Centre, (2015).

[82] McDermott, A., Millions of Seahorses Wind up Dead on the Black Market, Oceana, (2018).

[83] Foster, S.J., Kuo, T.C., Wan, A.K.Y., Vincent, A.C.J., Global Seahorse Trade Defies Export Bans Under CITES Action and National Legislation. The University of British Columbia, Fisheries Centre, (2018).

[84] Illegal Wildlife Trade in Belize: Millions Lost Annually, Wildlife Conservation Society, (2020).

[85] Id.

[86] Wildlife Protection Act, Chapter 220, (2000).

[87] Id.

[88] Young, A., Belize’s Ecosystems: Threats and Challenges to Conservation in Belize. Tropical Conservation Science, (2008).

[89] Id.

[90] Cherrington, E., Escalante, A., Cho, P., Forest Cover & Deforestation in Belize 2010-2012. CATHALAC, (2012).

[91] CITES I-II-III Timber Species Manual, USDA, (2006).

[92] Blundell, A., Mahogany and CITES: Moving Beyond the Veneer of Legality, Oryx Vol. 37, No. 1, (2003).

[93] Notification of the Parties No. 2004/005.

[94] Notification of the Parties No. 2021/059.

[95] Tricorache, P., et al, Pets and Pelts: Understanding and Combating Poaching and Trafficking in Cheetahs. Felidae, (2018).

[96] Tricorache, P., Stiles, D., Live Cheetahs, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, (2021).

[97] Somaliland Government Press Release, Arrests 10 Suspects in Two Separate Cases of Cheetah Trafficking. https://saxafimedia.com/somaliland-breaks-up-cheetah-trafficking-ring-arrests-10-suspects/ (last viewed Nov. 22, 2021).

[98] Stremlau, N., Governance without Government in the Somali Territories, Columbia University Journal of International Affairs, (2019).

[99] Fakhri, M., The WTO, Self-Determination, and Multi-Jurisdictional Sovereignty, ATJL Unbound, Vol. 108, (2015).

[100] Hinsley, A., & Roberts, D., Assessing the Extent of Access and Benefit Sharing in the Wildlife Trade: Lessons Learned from Horticulture Orchids in Southeast Asia. Environmental Conservation, 45(3), 261, (2018).